

TOWARD THE WELL-BEING OF MANKIND

FIFTY YEARS OF
THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

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all from the Memorial and the Foundation over the years, is at present getting help for its graduate research program, in which a number of young diplomats from the newly emergent nations are participating. In the thirties, too, assistance in the form of research grants to finance the holding of conferences and the publication of worthwhile study papers and books went to many organizations both here and abroad, among them the Foreign Policy Association; the Council on Foreign Relations; the Institute of Pacific Relations; the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London; the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, in Paris; and the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft, in Berlin.

When Day left the Foundation in 1937 to become president of Cornell University, Miss Sydnor Walker became the acting director of the social sciences division (this is the only time a woman has ever headed one of the divisions), and a year later Joseph H. Willits, who had been head of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania, took over. It was a time of doldrums, the eve of the great war, and, as Fosdick afterward wrote, "to speak of research in the field of international relations, for example, appeared almost a jest—and a bitter jest at that." Even so, one of Willits' first recommendations was that the Foundation's program in international relations be strengthened as part of a new effort "to anticipate the future." Continuing support was given to the Council on Foreign Relations for its "war and peace studies." These were private analyses by recognized experts with the aim of formulating independent appraisals of vital foreign policy matters, the results of which were sent to government agencies as well as to individual and group subscribers. Recognizing the fact that there was no training program in Russian affairs existing anywhere in the United States and aware of the seriousness of such a shortcoming as the Cold War shaped up, the Foundation in 1946 made one of its most significant and rewarding contributions when it donated \$250,000 to Columbia University toward the establishment of the Russian Institute. The Institute is accepted today as one of the great centers in the world for students to engage in advanced training and research in the whole field of Russian studies, including history and ideology, economic and political institutions, foreign relations, and literature. Similar centers have been created in its image by other universities. In 1961, the Foundation gave the Institute a terminal seven-year appropriation of \$300,000, its basic financing now having been assumed by Columbia.

During the forties, the Foundation also substantially assisted the Institute of International Studies at Yale, which had been established in 1935 to consider the behavior of nations and the history of war and to apply such knowledge to the clarification of American foreign policy; several other research groups that had been supported previously received further study

Willits
Congressman
pp?

Foreword

In 1963, The Rockefeller Foundation completed a half century of activity directed toward "the well-being of mankind throughout the world," as its charter defined its purpose. In the course of these fifty years, the Foundation, through its trustees, officers, and field staff, has carried out a broad program, comprising grants to educational and research institutions, a number of operating projects conducted by its own staff members, and fellowships to provide for individuals of promise to develop their full professional potential.

Among the earliest and largest undertakings were those in the fields of medicine and public health; these were later joined by others in the social sciences and the humanities, and in agriculture and related sciences. Although the bulk of its expenditure has been within the United States, the Foundation's program has been world-wide; and it has never hesitated to pursue its objectives in other lands where needs and opportunities were manifest.

In accord with the principle of flexibility and with changing needs, the Foundation has evolved its program over the years in a number of directions. Thus, as much of the early work in medicine and public health was gradually taken over by governmental or international public agencies, the Foundation moved more deeply into research and medical education. Similarly, Foundation activities in the natural sciences have taken new courses as other resources for the support of biochemistry, biophysics, physics, mathematics, and related disciplines became increasingly available.

Agriculture was added to the program in response to the apparent and growing need for vastly increased food supplies for a burgeoning population. This effort has now become thoroughly international, and the Foundation is currently cooperating in programs directed toward increased food production in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

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grants. It was during this time, too, that population studies became a vital concern of the Foundation, especially since the great demographic changes taking place in the world seemed so obviously destined to affect the flow of international relations. Beginning in 1944, the principal grants in this field went to the Office of Population Research at Princeton University; to the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, attached to Miami University in Oxford, Ohio; and, more recently, to the Population Council of New York, which since its founding in 1952 has awarded more than one hundred and fifty fellowships for advanced study in demography and for medical and biological training in the physiology of reproduction.

At this time, the social and economic consequences of atomic energy had already deeply concerned the Foundation, and preliminary grants were made to Cornell University, to the University of Chicago, and to one of the special committees of the Social Science Research Council to study these questions. The field of history, especially as it affected international relations, was not neglected. Significant contributions included a grant for Dr. William Langer, of Harvard, to prepare a history of American foreign policy from 1939 to 1946 under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations; one to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) for Dr. Frank Walters to write a history of the League of Nations; and another grant to the same institute for Professor Arnold Toynbee to prepare a history of international relations during the forties.

Marriage of Theory and Practice

These approaches, while worthwhile, had one important defect: they tended to contribute little to the study and solution of immediate or future foreign policy problems. Public officials complained that international studies were overly academic and remote; teachers were disturbed by the anti-intellectualism of policy-makers. The problem was one of communication. In the fifties, encouraged by the Foundation, scholars and practitioners of international relations came together at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. The program began with a series of individual awards, made as a result of consultations between the School and the Foundation, which went to scholars and to members of the State Department and the military establishment, who conducted their research at the School, at first on an informal basis. It was then decided to coordinate the various parts of this program more fully, and Dr. Arnold Wolfers was brought down from Yale University to head the newly created Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, which was attached to the Johns

EX-COMMUNIST WITNESSES

FOUR STUDIES IN FACT FINDING

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Church, and in June to leave the Party; in October his decisions were carried out. His disillusionment with communism was based on the Soviet enslavement of people, the recognition that Catholicism and communism were irreconcilable, and his awareness that all Communists were subservient to the Soviet dictatorship. He arrived gradually at his decision to leave the Party, since, as he explains, "Leaving the Communist Party is not a matter that you just decide to do . . . one day and do it the next. It is a struggle." His final leave-taking, however, was carefully thought out and executed. He had arranged for his job at Notre Dame two weeks prior to his defection, had asked for his *Daily Worker* check in advance for the week he resigned, and together with his family, was received back into the Church by Monsignor Fulton Sheen. The Party learned of Budenz's break from the radio and the press. They were so completely surprised that on the day the newspapers were reporting his break, his name was still carried on the masthead of the *Daily Worker*. Budenz chose this surreptitious method in order to forestall a smear campaign against him by his former comrades.

Arriving at Notre Dame, Budenz began his "year of silence"; he made no public appearance until he appeared on a radio broadcast in October 1946. He did, however, spend two weeks with the FBI, furnishing them with information, approximately four months after he arrived at the college. During the year he taught economics and journalism.

From October 1946 until recently, Budenz has testified on 33 separate occasions in Congressional hearings and court and administrative proceedings. His testimony has shed light on Communist penetration in almost every field and has included information bearing on the suitability of people to teach, to operate a radio station, or to remain in the Foreign Service. In addition to testifying, Budenz has written four books and numerous articles, has taught courses at Fordham University and Seton Hall College, and has lectured throughout the country on the subject of communism. In 1953, Budenz claimed he had received gross earnings of \$70,000 from his activities as a former Communist.

On February 13, 1957, Budenz suffered a severe heart attack while lecturing in Newport, Rhode Island. Because of his heart condition, he has not been called upon by the Government to testify during recent years.

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II

The confrontation of Louis Budenz and Owen Lattimore offers a unique opportunity to observe the processes by which a fragment of an ex-Communist witness's story has been expounded and tested—unique because of the almost "controlled" conditions of the "experiment." For what we have here is the development on two separate occasions, before two different Congressional committees, of testimony bearing on the same set of facts and tending to confirm or deny the same basic assertion: that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist conspiracy, acting under Communist directives to influence the course of American policy toward the Far East in conformity with the interests of Soviet Russia. And we have the "triers-of-fact," the two Congressional committees, arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions about the truth of that assertion.

We shall not be concerned here with who was right. Rather, we shall examine in detail the characteristic operations by which conclusions on this important issue of public policy have been reached and attempt to draw from our observations some tentative conclusions about the efficacy of the fact-finding processes used. We shall see what Budenz said and what he did not say, what questions he was asked and what questions he was not asked, what corroborative evidence was adduced and what was not adduced. We shall examine the political setting for its relationship to what was done and what was not done. And we shall ask whether enough evidence has been incorporated into the public record to enable an impartial observer to reach any conclusions.

The first of the two hearings in which Budenz developed his case against Lattimore was the State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation of March–June, 1950, which was conducted by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Senator Tydings of Maryland. The purpose of this hearing, which resulted in a printed record of 2,509 pages, was to investigate the charge made by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin that a number of Communists—variously listed as 205, 81, and 57—were on the payroll of the State Department. How all this came to center on the figure of Owen Lattimore, a man who never worked for the State Department, is a matter we shall examine in a moment.

The second hearing was the investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations undertaken by the Internal Security Subcommittee

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of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator McCarran of Nevada. This investigation, which examined allegations that the Institute was Communist-run and had improperly influenced the formation of foreign policy toward the Far East in the 1930's and 1940's, ran from July 1951 until June 1952 and resulted in a record of 5,713 pages of testimony and exhibits.

Both hearings ranged far afield from the question of whether Lattimore and certain others had participated knowingly in a Communist effort to influence American Far Eastern policy. Both hearings served as a means of massive inquiry into the failure of America's postwar Far Eastern policy, and especially into the reasons for the loss of China to communism. In the circumstances, the hearings inevitably gave rise to attacks and defense counterattacks over a broad range of American statecraft in which political passions took precedence over a full and fair exposition of facts. Nothing illustrates more vividly the influence of politics on the development of testimony than the manner in which Budenz came to be pitted on the witness stand against Lattimore.

III

On February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy made his famous speech at Wheeling, West Virginia, in which for the first time he accused the Secretary of State of keeping a number of Communists on the payroll of the Department despite his knowledge that they were Communists. The number he mentioned then was 205. On other occasions it was 87. On February 20, when the Senator made his maiden appearance in the Senate as a spy-catcher, it was 81. (The reaction in the Senate was immediate.) On February 22, a resolution was adopted directing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct a "full and complete study and investigation as to whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been, employed by the Department of State." A subcommittee was constituted to undertake the investigation and Senator Tydings was appointed its chairman. On March 8, 1950, the Tydings Committee, as it came to be known, opened its hearings with testimony from Senator McCarthy. On March 13, the Senator identified Lattimore before the Committee as "one of the principal architects of our far eastern policy" and a man with a "record as a pro-Communist"—not one of Senator McCarthy's more vigorous denunciations. But before long the charge was greatly exaggerated.

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Senator McCarthy informed the press that he had the name of the "top Russian espionage agent." In off-the-record conversations with reporters, he intimated that Lattimore was the man. On March 21, he testified before the Tydings Committee in executive session that he was willing to stake everything on the Lattimore case, and that if he was wrong, the subcommittee would be justified in not pursuing his charges further. He went so far as to assert that Lattimore was "the top of the whole ring of which Hiss was a part." By March 30, when Senator McCarthy delivered an omnibus speech in the Senate on Communist infiltration of the State Department, he was no longer quite so emphatic about Lattimore's role, referring to him as "one of the top Communist agents" and a "bad policy risk," and conceding that "in the case of Lattimore, I may have perhaps placed too much stress on the question of whether or not he has been an espionage agent." Nonetheless, the Lattimore case remained where the Senator had left it, the main prop for his charge about disloyalty in the State Department.

On April 6, Lattimore appeared before the Tydings Committee and categorically denied Senator McCarthy's charges. He asserted that he had never had anything to do with the formation of American foreign policy (it developed that he had never been officially connected with the State Department), denied Communist Party membership or Communist sympathies, and affirmed his loyalty to this country. After some questioning by members of the Committee, Senator Tydings made the following statement:

SENATOR TYDINGS Dr. Lattimore, your case has been designated as the No. 1 case, finally, in the charges made by Senator McCarthy. You have been called, substantially, I think, if not accurately quoting, the top Red spy agent in America. We have been told that if we had access to certain files that this would be shown.

I think as chairman of this committee that I owe it to you and to the country to tell you that four of the five members of this committee, in the presence of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, had a complete summary of your file made available to them. Mr. Hoover himself prepared those data. It was quite lengthy. And it was the conclusion of the reading of that summary in great detail, it was the universal opinion of all of the members of the committee present, and all others in the room, of which there were two more, that there was nothing in that file to show that you were a Communist or had ever been a Communist, or that you were in any way connected with any espionage information or charges, so that the FBI file puts you completely, up to this moment, at least, in the clear.

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It is interesting to note that this precedent-shattering revelation of FBI files was directed by the President at Senator Tydings' request after Senator McCarthy's repeated assertions that the files, if only they could be inspected, would offer substantiation for all his charges. Ironically enough, this McCarthy-instigated move appeared for the moment to have given the quietus to the Senator's charges against Lattimore.

However, the case was not over. There had been intimations earlier that a witness would be produced who would testify that Lattimore had been a Communist, and there was speculation that the witness might be Louis Budenz. The manner in which his name came to the committee's attention has never been made clear, but Budenz was subpoenaed to appear on April 20, 1950, two weeks after Lattimore's day of vindication. He appeared, according to his own statement, "as a reluctant if not unwilling witness." He had not been unwilling, however, to discuss Lattimore with friends of Senator McCarthy, and it seems fairly inferable that Budenz's appearance before the committee, regardless of his own personal feelings about testifying, represented an effort on the part of persons sympathetic to Senator McCarthy to pull the Senator's chestnuts out of the fire for him.

Budenz's testimony began with an identification of his own role in the Communist movement as managing editor of the *Daily Worker*. He explained that as a "leading member" of the Communist conspiracy he constantly received directives about the doings of a large number of people who were connected with the conspiracy.

... I had a liaison officer appointed who gave me instructions from day to day and in addition to that kept refreshing me on a list of about a thousand names which I was compelled to keep in my mind as to their various attitudes toward the Party, the various shifts and changes, whether a man had turned a traitor or whether he had not, and things of that sort. This list was not put down in writing because of the fact that it might be disclosed, consequently I was compelled to keep it in my mind, and this representative of the Political Bureau, the Politburo, kept refreshing my mind on this list of names. In that way I could examine a copy of the *Daily Worker* or any information or receive information intelligently.

He identified Jack Stachel as the man who served during a considerable part of his tenure on the *Daily Worker* as the liaison

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officer from the Politburo, the "dominant board in the Communist organization."

Budenz then described how the Communists infiltrated "various organizations and other key spots in this country." One such spot, he asserted, was the Institute of Pacific Relations, and he identified Frederick Vanderbilt Field as "one of the sources of the infiltration." Having established the existence of a Communist cell in the IPR, Budenz asserted that Lattimore was a member. He proceeded to enumerate five specific instances to support his assertion.

1. *Lattimore's Responsibility in 1937 for Placing Communist Writers in the Publication "Pacific Affairs."*

(MR. BUDENZ) In a specific meeting to which I refer, Mr. Lattimore was commended by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Earl Browder for the fact that he had been responsible for the placing of a number of Communist writers in the organs of the Institute of Pacific Affairs, of which he was then the editor.

Field was present at that meeting and made a report at which he commended Mr. Lattimore's zeal in seeing that Communists were placed as writers in *Pacific Affairs*, and that this had been particularly noted during this last year, 1936 and 1937. Mr. Browder also referred to that, and it was agreed that Mr. Lattimore should be given general direction of organizing the writers and influencing the writers in representing the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers, or as North Dakota nonpartisan leagues.

SENATOR TYDINGS Was Mr. Lattimore present at the meeting where this occurred?

MR. BUDENZ Oh, no, sir. He was not there.

SENATOR GREEN Do you know Mr. Lattimore?

MR. BUDENZ Do you mean personally?

SENATOR GREEN Yes.

MR. BUDENZ I do not.

SENATOR GREEN Have you ever seen Mr. Lattimore?

MR. BUDENZ No, sir; I have not. As a matter of fact, however, I did not see Mr. Alger Hiss, either, and I knew him to be a Communist and so testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

SENATOR GREEN But you are not reasoning that everyone you have never seen and never heard may be a Communist. Is that your argument?

MR. BUDENZ No, sir; that is not.

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2. *Lattimore and the 1943 Change in the Communist Line on Chiang Kai-shek.*

(MR. BUDENZ) In regard to another event that I could testify to, in 1943, at a regular meeting of the Political Bureau, at which Mr. Browder was present and others whom I could name, it was again officially reported that Mr. Lattimore, through Mr. Field, had received word from the apparatus that there was to be a change of line on Chiang Kai-shek. . . .

As a matter of fact what happened, according to the information received by us, was that from that time on we go after Chiang Kai-shek in the idea of a coalition government. The coalition government was a device used by the Communists always to slaughter those whom they brought into the coalition, and Moscow had some difficulty in advising the Communists to oppose Chiang Kai-shek, but at the same time to advise the public that we were still for Chiang Kai-shek, because they had to plead the coalition government, and coalition means that you do not denounce publicly the person you are coalescing with.

3. *"Consider Owen Lattimore as a Communist."*

(MR. BUDENZ) In addition to that, in 1944 I shall be able to state that Jack Stachel, at the time Mr. Lattimore went to China as an adviser to Vice-President Henry Wallace—and by the way, Mr. Wallace's trip was followed with very great care and detail by the Communist Party—that at that time Jack Stachel advised me to consider Owen Lattimore as a Communist, which to me meant, because that was our method of discussing these matters, to treat as authoritative anything that he would say or advise.

4. *Lattimore and the "Amerasia" Case.*

(MR. BUDENZ) Again in 1945, Senator, there arose the Amerasia case, the stealing of documents from Washington by Mr. Jaffe. I can say that, because he pleaded guilty and was fined \$2,500.

(MR. BUDENZ) Continuing, Senator, it was there reported by Jack Stachel that Mr. Lattimore had been in touch with some of the defendants, or they had been in touch with him, and that he had been of service in the Amerasia case.

5. *Lattimore and the Onionskin.*

(MR. BUDENZ) Now, in addition to that, however, I would like to say that up until 1940 or '41—of course when I say it is a summary of my evidence, it isn't the full body of it. In 1940 or '41, up until 1940 or '41, the Politburo of the Communist Party issued throughout the country on onionskin documents which were official documents sent to the National Committee members, and also I can't

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say to my knowledge, but to my best information, officially received, sent to Moscow. These Politburo meetings were full of the whole discussions which were conducted. They were on onionskin paper and were sent to a common center through a mail drop and distributed to the members of the National Committee. I recall that very specifically in Chicago, for example, where we received them through Morris Childs, representative of the Communist Party there.

These documents in the discussions on the Far East referred to various people in the Party by their initials, because otherwise they would be disclosed, and in those documents in the discussion of Mr. Lattimore his name appeared under the initial "L" or "XL." I was so advised by Jack Stachel in the office in New York and as a matter of fact, these onionskin papers were considered so confidential that we were forbidden to burn them. We had to tear them up in small pieces and destroy them through the toilet. Then later we were ordered to give them to a common center.

As a matter of fact, much of the Communist devices are carried on through these onionskin instructions, which constantly are carried forward. The reason burning is forbidden is that it would create attention and would leave a ember.

However, I do wish to state that on these reports to the Politburo, some of which may be available, though I don't know where they would be—there is the initial "L" or "XL" on Far Eastern affairs, which refers to Mr. Lattimore. We were so advised and instructed for our information.

The examination of Budenz was about as pointed an examination as has ever befallen any ex-Communist witness in a Congressional hearing. It concentrated on four aspects of his story that seemed open to question: the hearsay nature of his accusations, his failure to make them at an earlier time, his unfamiliarity with Lattimore's writings, and the improbability of his account with respect to the onionskin documents. Four examples of these lines of inquiry are given below.

The hearsay nature of his accusations. This point was so obvious from the outset of Budenz's testimony that one wonders why he did not disarm criticism by bringing it forward himself. But he did not, and it was piled out of him with telling effect. For example, with reference to his description of the 1937 meeting in which Field and Browder lauded Lattimore's work for the Party, Budenz was pressed by the committee's chief counsel, Mr. Edward P. Morgan, to recall just what Field had said about Lattimore, but he was unable to elaborate. Mr. Morgan continued to press Budenz about his personal knowledge that Lattimore was subject to Com-

munist Party discipline. Budenz referred to reports he had received from Stachel, to which he attempted to give stature by emphasizing Stachel's role as the Party's chief disciplinarian. His interrogators were not satisfied with this response and continued the questioning until Budenz finally conceded:

MR. BUDENZ Outside of what I was officially told by the Communist leaders, I do not know of Mr. Lattimore as a Communist.

An extended passage of questioning by Senator Lodge attempted to pin down the nature of Budenz's knowledge about the "instructions" from the Communist Party that Lattimore allegedly had received.

SENATOR LODGE I would like, if you could say when, where, and how Lattimore received these instructions, or this instruction.

MR. BUDENZ Well, now, Senator, here I am in executive session, I suppose, and in this respect I will have to mention the fact that necessarily I did not follow Mr. Lattimore around. I only know that in Political Bureau meetings, which I attended, I heard instructions made that these things were going forward in the tremendous campaign which took place in book after book on this subject.

Now, that Mr. Lattimore personally had a conference with this gentleman or that, I cannot tell you.

SENATOR TYNDGOS How was that?

MR. BUDENZ That he had a conference with this writer or that one, I cannot tell you because I was not present.

SENATOR TYNDGOS I did not catch that.

MR. BUDENZ But, I have heard reports that this campaign was proceeding, and that it bore full fruit about 1943.

SENATOR LODGE Do you know, did any Communist worker tell you that he told Lattimore to start this campaign?

MR. BUDENZ Oh, yes; that was the substance of this report. That was why I was advised, not only that they had started—

SENATOR LODGE Who told you that?

MR. BUDENZ That was the report made in regard to this session in 1937. This was Browder's report, and Field's report.

SENATOR LODGE He told you that Lattimore had received these instructions?

MR. BUDENZ Yes; that he had received these—that is to say, first, I was thinking of the meeting when they said they were going to give them to him. Later on there followed this report and others verifying them, specifically Browder and Stachel confirmed that the instructions were being carried out.

SENATOR LODGE Did they say there they had given them, somebody going to see him at his house, or were they given to him over the telephone?

MR. BUDENZ No, No.

SENATOR LODGE You don't know the procedure?

MR. BUDENZ As a matter of fact, Senator, the Communist reports to the Politburo do not go into details of that character. They give the general report on the campaign that is taking place, what is happening, and a general résumé of the situation.

SENATOR LODGE So, you could not pinpoint all those details?

MR. BUDENZ No; I never so claimed.

Budenz stated that he knew the instructions were being carried out because of the books and magazines that were being produced in response to them. Thereupon he was questioned about his knowledge of the books and magazines.

SENATOR TYNDGOS You have read all these articles yourself?

MR. BUDENZ Which articles?

SENATOR TYNDGOS The ones to which you are referring.

MR. BUDENZ A long time ago I glanced through them.

SENATOR TYNDGOS I would not say when, but you have read them all?

MR. BUDENZ A long time ago, yes. I wouldn't say all of them, Senator, but—

SENATOR TYNDGOS A great many?

MR. BUDENZ That is taking in too much.

These examples are fairly illustrative of the tendentiousness of Budenz's examination on the sources of his knowledge. The purpose and effect of this questioning was to create the impression that Budenz's knowledge was entirely of a hearsay nature and, further, that it was so general as to be valueless. Budenz himself, with the occasional aid of Senator Hickenlooper, attempted to bolster the quality of his information by stressing the conspiratorial nature of Party activities and the great importance attached to placing accurate information in his hands. His position, he avowed, made it a matter of "political life and death" for him to know what he was talking about. These rehabilitative efforts were manifold, but the net impression left by the persistent and hostile questioning of committee members and their counsel was that Budenz's story was dubious and unsubstantiated.

Budenz's failure to accuse Lattimore earlier. This point provided perhaps the most substantial source of doubt as to the validity of Budenz's testimony, and it was exploited to the fullest by the committee in its questioning. This questioning pursued two general lines. The first was aimed at pointing up the fact that Budenz had had frequent opportunities to divulge his knowledge about Lattimore but had failed to do so. Budenz's own statement pro-

vided the springboard for this inquiry. In developing his own stature as an authority on Communist penetration he repeatedly referred to his collaboration with the FBI. These references naturally prompted inquiry into the extent of his collaboration and raised the question of why he had never mentioned Lattimore's name. The substance of his answer was that he had more important people to deal with, which, as his questioners were quick to note, seemed somewhat inconsistent with the view he was now taking about Lattimore's importance as an exponent of the Communist line in policy toward China.

More damaging than this general failure to bring up Lattimore's name was the fact that there had been at least two occasions on which Budenz was squarely presented with the opportunity to link Lattimore with the Communist Party. Budenz's failure to do so, if he then believed Lattimore to be a Communist, could be characterized as, at the very least, evasive. The occasions are worth describing in detail, both because of their intrinsic importance and because of the light they shed on the difficulties of conducting an adequate examination of issues as sprawling and untidy as the question of whether Owen Lattimore, or any other man, had been a consciously participating member of the Communist Party.

The first incident concerned a magazine article that Budenz wrote for Collier's in 1949 entitled "The Menace of Red China." The article was concerned, among other things, with Communist influences on the formation of American policy toward China. Lattimore's name was not mentioned in the article. However, it developed that his name had been mentioned in an earlier draft of the article and then omitted after a conference with Leonard Parris, an associate editor of the magazine. The draft was made available to the committee. The strongest statement in it about Lattimore was that he had been "frequently referred to in (Communist) reports by Mr. (Frederick Vanderbilt) Field, and always in the most complimentary manner." This statement was deleted from the article on the basis of a discussion between Budenz and Parris, a transcript of which was introduced into the record of the hearing. The transcript, as well as the draft of the article, was handed to the committee by Mr. Abe Fortas, counsel for Lattimore. It is noteworthy that the committee deviated from customary Congressional procedure enough to permit Mr. Fortas to submit questions (but

not to ask them himself) which the committee's counsel then put to Budenz. This uneasy compromise between Congressional and judicial procedure did not work any too well. Mr. Morgan found himself in the awkward position of propounding a series of questions which had been handed to him only a moment earlier and with which he had no opportunity to familiarize himself. The results, naturally enough, were something short of perfect, but some interesting material did emerge.

The most relevant extracts from the transcript of the interview between Budenz and Parris read as follows:

Q. (By Mr. Parris) You have done one thing here that I think is not good. By inference you implied that Joe Barnes and Lattimore are not Communists exactly but are fellow travelers. . . .

A. I think probably what we ought to do is to leave out those names entirely. Perhaps we can rephrase it some way. I said it merely to show that they would add meat to what I was saying.

Q. On page 7 you say "This idea of the 'upstanding Chinese Communists, the great agrarian reformers,' was peddled everywhere from that time on." You haven't given a single instance that it was peddled or that the idea was planted by the Communists. Give at least one instance, or more than one if possible.

A. Lattimore and Barnes became champions of some of these ideas as time went on.

Q. You're not saying that they acted as Communist agents in any way?

A. No.

Q. That ought to be quite clear.

A. Oh, yes.

Budenz's reply adroitly made use of the theory that Communists have a policy of destroying their opponents by bringing libel suits, and in doing so, seemed to reflect somewhat on Parris:

MR. MORGAN Question by counsel for Mr. Lattimore: It is my understanding that at the time of this conference you did not claim that Mr. Lattimore acted as a Communist agent in any way, and that is still your view?

MR. BUDENZ No, sir. I was very well aware, especially with Mr. Parris' peculiar questions, which indicated to me that he might have a particular viewpoint, that I was to answer in such a way as to avoid Communist attack through libel, such as I know was their policy. Consequently, this was not a discussion under oath. This was a discussion of an article, and I think that I have indicated quite well there that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes were involved in this campaign.

MR. MORGAN Further question: As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore states that he never referred to Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers or in any terms that meant the same thing. Can you tell us any specific instance in which you claim Mr. Lattimore did refer to the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers?

MR. BUDENZ Well, I would have to have opportunity to check on that. Mr. Counsel, but my statement against Mr. Lattimore is not that he personally stated this. He was always considered to be in a special and delicate position. But that he was given the responsibility of organizing this campaign.

MR. MORGAN Mr. Chairman—

MR. BUDENZ I am—I would like to have the privilege of submitting to this committee an analysis of Mr. Lattimore's writings in time. I have not had the opportunity to do so.

MR. MORGAN Mr. Chairman, this document is, of course—I was not familiar with it. . . .

The issue was not further pressed at that moment but was returned to at a later point in the interrogation of Budenz:

SENATOR GREEN Now, this morning you stated something that attracted my attention. I think, for your sake, we ought to clear it up. That was in connection with your discussion with the editors of Collier's about the article, and in explanation of some apparent discrepancy, you stated, "Well, this was a conference. It wasn't under oath."

Do you make a distinction between answers that are made solemnly and without oath, and those made under oath.

MR. BUDENZ No, sir; but I do make this statement: Here was a conference on my article. I know very well, Senator, that the Communists have a plan to harass and destroy a man by libel actions. When I received such peculiar questions from Mr. Parris, I immediately intended to shut him off, and as a matter of fact I am compelled to do that repeatedly. People come to me with all sorts of questions. I can't get rid of them.

In this case, I also was dealing with an article not yet completed, and I do not distinguish between under oath and otherwise, except in the sense that I cannot commit myself or permit myself to be attacked by someone who tried to draw me out.

SENATOR GREEN You mean, under those circumstances, you are willing to put them off by stating something that is not true?

MR. BUDENZ Well, I would not say "not true," but that doesn't make the matter—

SENATOR GREEN What expression would you prefer, having the same meaning—false? How would you put it? Put it in your own words.

MR. BUDENZ Well, I would say, Senator, this: That for me to say to Mr. Parris that Mr. Lattimore was a Communist agent, in the way

that Mr. Parris was pressing me, would have been of no advantage to the article, and would have, at the same time, have been a matter of attack upon me.

The matter was not further developed. The reader will have to judge for himself whether Parris (who was not called to testify) had been "pressing" Budenz with "peculiar" questions.

The second occasion involved a communication between Budenz and a State Department investigator in 1947. An extended quotation from the record at this point is in order, both for its substantive content and for a revealing glimpse of Budenz's demeanor as a witness.

SENATOR GREEN Did you talk to a special agent of the State Department in September 1947, about communists?

MR. BUDENZ I don't recall that.

SENATOR GREEN In September 1947 did you talk to any special agent—in 1947—of the State Department?

MR. BUDENZ I don't recall that, Senator.

SENATOR TYNDGOS Did you say, in that interview with this State Department agent that you were not prepared to pass judgment upon the degree of Mr. Lattimore's association with the Party, that you thought he was a sympathizer but that you were unable to recall at that time any incident which definitely indicated that he was a member of the Party?

MR. BUDENZ Well, I do not recall that, but if I did, it was in a telephone conversation, and I am very evasive on the telephone, and with very good reason, as anyone who considers how the Communists act, can understand. I have to be very careful.

SENATOR TYNDGOS Would you therefore deny that you said in 1947, to any representative of the State Department, that you could not be called at that time, you could not recall any incident which definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party?

MR. BUDENZ I won't deny it.

SENATOR TYNDGOS You won't?

MR. BUDENZ I would not deny it or affirm it, because on the telephone—

SENATOR TYNDGOS I am not talking about on the telephone.

MR. BUDENZ Well, I am sure that the only time I ever talked with a representative of the State Department, except in one specific case, was on the telephone, and I did not give information on the telephone.

SENATOR TYNDGOS But, why would you not have said, rather than "I do not recall at this time any instance which definitely indicates that Lattimore was a member of the Party," why would you not have

said, if you did not want to talk on the telephone, "I do not care to discuss the matter on the telephone," or something else, other than the affirmative statement that you didn't recall any instance which definitely indicated that Lattimore was a member of the party?

MR. BUDENZ I just used that device, if that is the case.

SENATOR TYNDGOS Would that put you in a position of making a statement that might not be true, or does it not?

MR. BUDENZ Not necessarily, sir. Maybe I had not had Lattimore on my mind. You must understand, Senator, in regard to cases of this character, I had been very careful. That is to say, I do not make assertions unless I check very carefully on the case, and in checking up, know exactly what the facts are.

SENATOR TYNDGOS But, in this case you had nothing to check up on other than your conversation with Mr. Stachel, because he was the man that had previously—

MR. BUDENZ Oh, yes; I may have had—

SENATOR TYNDGOS Excuse me, because I am directing myself particularly to the testimony that Mr. Stachel and some other people, I think it was Stachel who said "You are to consider Lattimore as a member of the Party?"

MR. BUDENZ That is correct.

SENATOR TYNDGOS And you were outlined about more activities there, and you were told that Lattimore was very helpful—

MR. BUDENZ That is correct.

SENATOR TYNDGOS You were also told that the movement was progressing very favorably and you knew Lattimore was head of the magazine.

Well now, if you had all that information in your mind, why would you say, in September 1947, that you did not recall at that time any incident which definitely indicated that Lattimore was a member of the Party?

MR. BUDENZ I don't recall that statement, but if I made it, under the circumstances, I made it on the telephone, and therefore was not prepared, unless by very careful examination, which I always give, to make statements that are definite.

SENATOR TYNDGOS But, there is no record necessary for you to fix your—no record you could look up by research, you might say, in the case I have in mind, if Stachel told you that orally—why would you not have said, knowing this, knowing about Lattimore and knowing about the writing and knowing that Stachel had told you to consider Lattimore as a Communist, why would not you have said "I would like to talk about it with you, but privately," or "I don't care to discuss it," other than to make the affirmative statement that "I recall of no instance now that would indicate that he, Lattimore, was a member of the Party?"

MR. BUDENZ Well, in the first place, I have only given information

fully to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That has been my rule.

Secondly, I do not know people who promiscuously call me on the telephone and I have to be very careful.

SENATOR TYNDGOS I appreciate that, but what I am trying to get at, Mr. Budenz, and I don't want to prolong it—

MR. BUDENZ I understand.

SENATOR TYNDGOS I do not blame you for saying over the telephone, "I don't care to discuss it," or "I don't blame you for saying on the telephone that, "This is something I might want to talk to you privately about"; but, instead of picking one of the things that would have protected the position you rightly wanted to protect, did you not say at that time, "I am unable to recall at this time any incident which definitely would indicate that Lattimore was a member of the Party?" And to convey the impression to your own Government, after you left the Communist Party, that you had nothing in mind that would show Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party?

MR. BUDENZ I did not have the time or energy to check carefully on the facts I had before me. I always do that, and I have made that reply, incidentally, more than once, along similar lines.

The effect of the questioning on these two specific occasions, and of Budenz's failure to mention Lattimore as a Communist, either in public testimony or in giving information to the FBI, at any time between his break with the Party in 1943 and Senator McCarthy's accusations against Lattimore in 1950, was to suggest that his testimony about Lattimore might have been a recent fabrication.

Budenz's unfamiliarity with Lattimore's writings. Budenz was extensively questioned about Lattimore's expressed views which appeared inconsistent with his being a Communist. This line of questioning not only tended to cast doubt on the accuracy of the information about Lattimore that Budenz had claimed to receive from his Communist associates, but served the further purpose of demonstrating Budenz's lack of acquaintance with Lattimore's work. Once again, the questioning was used by Lattimore's counsel and executed, not too successfully, by counsel for the committee.

MR. MORGAN Further question: As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore states that he never referred to Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers or in any terms that meant the same thing. Can you tell us any specific instance in which you claim Mr. Lattimore did refer to the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers?

MR. BUDENZ Well, I would have to have opportunity to check on that. Mr. Counsel, but my statement against Mr. Lattimore is not that he

personally stated this. He was always considered to be in a special and delicate position. But that he was given the responsibility of organizing this campaign.

MR. MORGAN Mr. Chairman—

MR. BUDENZ I am—I would like to have the privilege of submitting to this committee an analysis of Mr. Lattimore's writings in time. I have not had the opportunity to do so.

MR. MORGAN Mr. Chairman, this document is, of course—I was not familiar with it. . . .

Budenz was further questioned about a review of Lattimore's book, *Situation in Asia*, which appeared in the *Daily Worker* in 1949. The review criticized Lattimore for going "completely off the beam" in suggesting that emerging nationalism in Asia sought to remain independent of both America and Russia, and proceeded to criticize his conclusions about the struggle for power between those two nations. Although Budenz began by expressing hesitation about testifying on things that happened after he left the Party, he readily allowed himself to be drawn into opining on the treatment of pro-Communists in the Communist press. In so doing, he put himself in an "either-or" position that invited speedy retaliation from the chairman of the committee.

MR. MORGAN Now may I ask you, as having been editor of the *Daily Worker*, was it ordinary or customary in reviews of books in the *Daily Worker* to speak critically of one who is projecting, so it has been stated here, a policy for the Soviet Union?

MR. BUDENZ Yes, sir, I can explain to you that we had the policy in protecting people who are out beyond the Party proper, to criticize them with faint praise—that is to say, that is, to damn them with faint praise—rather, to praise them with faint damn, is the way I want to put it.

Now I can give to this committee examples of that, but I just will have to have time. However, I would like to analyze this, not as a member of the Party but for just a moment out of my experience.

In the first place, you will note that the whole emphasis here is on the "Situation in Asia" criticized United States Government policy in the Far East." You will note Mr. Lattimore's premise of the immediate action is approved. That is the important thing for Stalin. Communists don't go around saying, "We are Communists." They are pushing a certain line; I mean the Communists beyond the Party. This approves Mr. Lattimore's main premise, and it also comes as a conclusion of that where it says that what he is advocating, if followed out, certain things will have to be done.

What does it speak to Mr. Lattimore under all this extensive

verbiage? It speaks to two things: that he puts forward a third-course idea, and, secondly, that he is still advocating capitalism in a way. Now, the *Daily Worker* knows that Mr. Lattimore in his position can do nothing else but be with capitalism as such. They know that this third force exists because it was discussed while I was in the Party, that it is something which the Communists have proposed from time to time; they constantly develop third forces. At the present moment they understand that it is practically impossible—I am only saying that, not as a far eastern expert, Mr. Chairman, which I am not, but merely from the discussions within the Party before I left—that it is impossible to develop a third force in Asia at the present moment. That is to say, either you are going to be with Chiang Kai-shek or you are going to be with the Reds. That is to say, you can't take a neutral attitude.

SENATOR TYDINGS I do not want to be with either one of them in the situation right now.

Budenz's readiness to interpret what the *Daily Worker* had to say about *Situation in Asia* was put in a rather unfavorable light by a line of questioning that demonstrated his unfamiliarity not only with the body of Lattimore's work, but also with that very book.

SENATOR GREEN You claim that Mr. Lattimore's views on China have changed in accordance with the change in the Communist line, is that your point?

MR. BUDENZ I would not wish to be able to pass upon that until I have examined all of Mr. Lattimore's writings, as I have said.

SENATOR GREEN How many of his books have you read?

MR. BUDENZ Very few, in a very fragmentary way. I am not in a position to pass upon Mr. Lattimore's writings, except in a general way, except on his last book *Situation in Asia*.

SENATOR GREEN Then, he might not have followed the Communist line in his previous books, I believe he has published 11.

MR. BUDENZ That we can see when we analyze them, as far as I am concerned.

SENATOR GREEN If you think that one book shows he is a Communist, because he is following the line, and the other books did not, what would be the weight or balance of evidence?

MR. BUDENZ It would have to depend, of course, that is why I must analyze the book, we cannot talk about this in such shorthand terms. It seems to me, Senator, I would have to analyze the book.

Now as a matter of fact I have come here before the committee to testify to certain facts of my own knowledge, to the extent that I have been informed of them; so far as these other matters are concerned, I have not had the opportunity to analyze them. I have offered to analyze them and shall do so if the committee so desires.

more's name had been injected into the picture, and people were generally talking about Lattimore and evidence against Lattimore. I saw Huber there and I was rather surprised. I mean I hadn't seen Huber, I suppose, a month or 2 months, 6 weeks, whatever it was. So, I listened to what was going on. I just listened to what it was, I heard that Senator McCarthy had suggested he be called, I was rather surprised. They hadn't consulted me on it.

Extended comment seems superfluous. On the one hand, the majority members of the committee deliberately curtailed the investigative process at a point far short of what was necessary and feasible. On the other hand, the committee's minority counsel displayed what at the very least would seem to be a disingenuous attitude toward the work of the committee. The episode is all too typical of the way political considerations influence the development of the facts in a way that results in something less than a full and fair exposition.

The next witness before the subcommittee was Earl Browder, former Secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, who had been implicated by Budenz's testimony in the alleged infiltration of the Institute of Pacific Relations and, specifically, in the plans to use Lattimore to organize writers to follow the Communist line on Far Eastern policy. After sketching his career in the Communist Party, including his ouster as Secretary in 1945 and his expulsion from the Party in 1946, Browder was asked about the use of the IPR for Communist propaganda purposes.

MR. MORGAN Was any effort made by the Communist Party to employ the Institute of Pacific Relations, and any publications of that organization, that that organization might have, to advance the policy that you say was the policy of the Communist Party with respect to China?

MR. BROWDER We never considered such a thing as practical, for any serious consideration at all.

MR. MORGAN Would you say that you did not employ the Institute of Pacific Relations for that?

MR. BROWDER I would say very definitely that we did not.

MR. MORGAN Did the Communist Party, to your knowledge, have individuals in the Institute of Pacific Relations or associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, upon which you relied or depended or employed for the purpose of advancing this policy?

MR. BROWDER No, it did not.

In answer to questions about Lattimore, Browder denied know-

ing Lattimore or ever having met him. This, of course, was not inconsistent with the testimony given by Budenz. But Browder went on to deny that he had ever heard Lattimore's name mentioned in Party circles and that he had ever discussed Lattimore with anyone in the Communist Party. With specific reference to the alleged 1937 meeting, Browder denied that any such meeting had taken place. He also denied ever seeing Lattimore's name or initials mentioned in any onianskin reports, such as those Budenz had described, and went on to treat the question of the onianskin reports in the following categorical terms:

MR. MORGAN You mean, no such reports were received?

MR. BROWDER I never heard of such reports, never saw such reports, and I doubt the existence of such reports.

MR. MORGAN Was it customary, Mr. Browder, to have reports made in that manner on onianskin paper?

MR. BROWDER On onianskin paper? Well, I certainly don't deny the existence of onianskin paper, in my office and every other office I ever had any connection with, usually used for manifold copies of letters, and so on, and for elimination of bulk in the storage of archives.

MR. MORGAN What I have in mind, Mr. Browder, is not just the matter of onianskin reports on onianskin paper. I mean, was it customary in the Communist Party to receive reports in which individuals were designated by symbols, rather than by name?

MR. BROWDER No; neither on onianskin nor bond.

Finally, Browder testified that he was familiar with Lattimore's name, that Lattimore was such a prominent person that if he had been a Communist, the fact could not have escaped his, Browder's, attention, but that, on the contrary, Lattimore was known to him "as a person of anti-Communist views, of a very decided and profound character."

Browder then proceeded to attack Budenz's stature as a Communist. He described Budenz as a mere technician who had nothing to do with policy matters.

MR. BROWDER Budenz was never anything but a technical man in the staff of the *Daily*. He was not a political man.

SENATOR MC MABON Didn't he have the title of managing editor?

MR. BROWDER Yes.

SENATOR MC MABON Didn't that title carry with it the usual purposes of such a title on the newspaper?

MR. BROWDER I don't know what the usual purposes of such a title are, but in our paper it means the technical editor.

SENATOR MC MABON What do you mean?

MR. BROWDER The only field in which he was qualified was the technique of newspaper production. He was in charge of copy and so on. I suppose that, in a large modern newspaper, he would be what you would call the copy editor.

SENATOR MC MABON He had nothing to do with policy?

MR. BROWDER No.

SENATOR MC MABON You regarded him as a loyal Party member?

MR. BROWDER We had no reason at that time to question his loyalty, but we did discuss—question his capacity for anything beyond the technical newspaper production.

SENATOR MC MABON Was it customary for the contributors to your paper to call at the offices of the *Daily Worker* and leave their material, or was it sent in from time to time?

MR. BROWDER Both—both.

SENATOR MC MABON You said that you had him in a conference for some work to be done on the Roman Catholic policy. What was the nature of that work, if you care to say?

MR. BROWDER Well, he prided himself very much on his ability to spread communism among the Catholics, and we naturally humored that in hopes that it might develop something through it, and the conference—

SENATOR MC MABON Louder.

MR. BROWDER Conferences were held at his insistence, to discuss that problem.

SENATOR MC MABON He initiated that himself?

MR. BROWDER Yes. He was the man who was also pressing it, and the necessity and the possibilities of spreading communism among the church members.

Browder's account is obviously at variance with Budenz's in many vital respects. Unlike the testimony of Bella Dodd, his testimony cannot be discounted on the ground of lack of firsthand knowledge. Plainly, either Browder or Budenz was lying.

Browder conceded that he knew Frederick Vanderbilt Field as a Communist, but denied ever having given Field any special missions of the sort described by Budenz, or having participated with Field in conferences relating to infiltration of the IPR and the use of Lattimore as an organizer of pro-Communist writers on Far Eastern policy.

Field followed Browder as a witness. In his prepared statement he denied ever having been associated with Lattimore in any

connection except their work in the IPR, with which Field was connected from 1928 to 1940. He denied having had any association with Lattimore as a Communist. With respect to his own affiliation, he informed the committee that he was invoking the privilege against self-incrimination.

In the questioning that followed, Field refused to answer questions about membership in the Communist Party or about his acquaintances with any person but Owen Lattimore. So rigidly did he adhere to this policy that he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to say whether or not he knew Dr. Philip Jessup. The committee accused him of acting contemptuously, and an examination of his testimony suggests that it is a fairly clear example of improper invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Curiously enough, he answered all questions about Lattimore with perfect freedom, while declining to answer questions about other persons who, if he was telling the truth about Lattimore, were known to him in the same innocent connection. One is forced to conclude either that Field was committing perjury in his testimony about Lattimore or that he was fashioning his own rules of pertinence with respect to the scope of the committee's inquiry.

His testimony about Lattimore is pretty well summed up in the following passages:

SENATOR TYDINGS I might ask you again, for emphasis, if you have already answered it—Do you, or do you not of your own knowledge, know whether or not he is a member of the Communist Party?

MR. FIELD To the very best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lattimore is not a member of the Communist Party.

SENATOR TYDINGS Might I ask you if any time in any of your associations with Mr. Lattimore, in the conduct of the Institute of Pacific Relations, or in the publication of the magazine *Amerasia*, you saw or detected anything that aroused your suspicions that he was writing, not objectively, but—but rather objectively to accomplish a purpose that was not to the best interest of the United States?

MR. FIELD No, I never did. On the contrary, I spent many years working for this research organization, in association with scholars; and it is quite evident that Professor Lattimore has the reputation of being one of the most outstanding scholars on the Far East in this country. He has a world-wide reputation in this sense.

SENATOR TYDINGS Now, at any time during your association with this Institute of Pacific Affairs, and your position as chairman, I believe it was, of the editorial board, or on the editorial board of the magazine *Amerasia*, did you or do you know of anyone else who sug-

gested, connived, or aided in putting Communist articles in that magazine through the medium of Mr. Lattimore?

MR. FIELD No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR TYDINGS Do you or do you not know of any time that Mr. Lattimore knowingly aided in the publication of an article that was written, so far as you know, by a Communist?

MR. FIELD No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Field's testimony is inferentially contradictory to Budenz's, but not quite so directly as Browder's, because of his invocation of the Fifth Amendment on questions relating to his own activities, including possible attendance at the famous 1937 meeting. Curiously enough, even though Browder had testified that he knew Field, Field declined to say whether he knew Browder. Field's testimony also contradicts the hearsay account given by Kerley of Huber's attendance at a meeting at Field's house in 1946 at which Lattimore was present. Huber's story is also contradicted, it should be noted, by a telegram from Field's ex-wife stating that she was not and had never been a Communist and that Lattimore had not attended any meeting or party at the Field home in 1946.

The Lattimore phase of the Tydings Committee inquiry was concluded by the reappearance on the witness stand of Lattimore himself. He stated forcefully that the testimony against him came down to no more than the assertions of Budenz, and attacked those assertions in general and in specifics. It will serve no useful purpose to examine Lattimore's testimony in detail. It presented to one favorably disposed toward his cause a highly convincing defense of the integrity of his professional life. It was obviously so greeted by those who heard it. But to an entirely detached observer, there are disturbing overtones here and there that suggest something less than complete candor about his awareness of the Communist tendencies of some of those with whom he necessarily worked on Far Eastern problems. Like Budenz, Lattimore appeared to suffer from a complete inability to admit that he had ever been wrong, mistaken, uninformed, or naive. In the context of the Tydings Committee hearings, that jarring note is struck only occasionally. But it was to become a dominant theme in the IPR hearings two years later.

One final word about the Tydings Committee hearings. It became fashionable in some quarters in the years immediately fol-

lowing these hearings to refer to them as a "whitewash." An examination of the whole record does not seem to me to support that assertion if by it is meant a willful blindness toward available evidence that would tend to support the conclusion that Lattimore was a Communist agent. There was certainly enough opportunity to develop whatever evidence on that score was available. It does not appear from the record that there was any suppression of evidence, and one may be quite confident that the vigorous partisanship of the minority members of the committee would have resulted in exposure of any efforts to camouflage or conceal unpalatable truths.

That does not mean that the conduct of the hearings was immune to criticism. It was not. The questioning of witnesses showed lack of preparation. The manner in which the testimony was brought forth was chaotic. That is one of the great weaknesses of the Congressional inquiry as a fact-finding process, particularly when it is operating under as much pressure as this one was. The spring of 1950, immediately preceding the outbreak of the Korean War, was hardly a time when members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had nothing else on their minds but an investigation of Senator McCarthy's allegations about the State Department. But the fact that the diffusion of effort is readily explicable does not detract from its unfortunate effect. These hearings sprawled over a period of four months. There were long adjournments. There was little continuity. During the hearings, no one concerned appeared to have mastered the record in a way that would permit the effective examination of witnesses.

Two aspects of the committee's conduct deserve special criticism. The first is the failure to recall Budenz to the stand after the testimony of Dodd, Field, and Browder. Both in fairness to him and in the interest of sharpening the issues, he should have been interrogated on the many points of conflict between his testimony and theirs. The second is the committee's refusal to allow counsel for the minority to participate in the questioning of witnesses. No individual senator had the time adequately to prepare a line of questioning, and the questions directed by the various members of the committee demonstrated this weakness. The committee's chief counsel, Mr. Morgan, functioned with a conspicuous degree of fairness, considering the political pressure he was undoubtedly under. But the minority had no effective voice. One

may surmise that the majority's decision not to permit questions by minority counsel was due in large part to the feeling that the gentleman who occupied that post, Mr. Robert Morris, was a close associate of Senator McCarthy's, and that the disruption that giving him his head would have entailed was not something they were willing to undergo. Whatever the tactical motivations for this decision, it made the conduct of the hearings appear something less than impartial, and as we have noted before, in matters of this sort the appearance of fairness may be as important as the reality.

IV

The second group of hearings in which the case of Budenz versus Lattimore was tried out in the public record began in July 1951, only a year after the conclusion of the Tydings Committee hearings. It was a year of many memorable events, including the beginning of the Korean struggle, and on the domestic scene it was a year in which the issue of communism in American life continued to make both news and votes. Senator Tydings, who headed the inquiry that had exonerated Lattimore, fell at the polls in November 1950 before the charge that he was "soft on Communism." His defeat was a sign of the mood of the times.

The IPR hearings grew out of the seizure by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which turned out, on examination, to contain much data suggesting substantial influence by Communists on the work of the Institute. The inquiry was a far more wide-ranging one than that undertaken by the Tydings Committee, which was not itself (as has been earlier suggested) a model of concentration. Once again, however, the opposing figures of Louis Budenz and Owen Lattimore occupied the center of the stage.

This time, Budenz had his turnings first. He testified before the committee on August 22 and October 1, 1951. There was little new in his testimony. What was new was the manner of his questioning by this committee, which was in complete contrast to the tone of his interrogation by the Tydings Committee. Clearly, the attempt was to build his stature as a witness and thus to characterize his information as being highly reliable. This time, the objections to his testimony as hearsay were met head-on at the beginning of the questioning, and this seeming disadvantage was turned to advantage.

MR. MORRIS At the outset, Mr. Budenz, were you in a position in the Communist Party where you would have access to more secrets, to the identity of more people, than the ordinary Communist?

MR. BUDENZ Most decidedly. Indeed, more than the normal member of the National Committee.

MR. MORRIS Why is that, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ As managing editor of the *Daily Worker*, it was essential that I know the various delicate turns and twists of the line; not only of the line but of the emphasis of the line in the particular period of time.

THE CHAIRMAN When you say "line" in that respect, what do you mean, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ I mean the Communist viewpoint at that particular moment, the Communist objective. This has nothing to do fundamentally with the Communist philosophy, except that it is an expression of it in action during a period of time. And that had to be emphasized in the *Daily Worker*, not merely as to what the line was but as to its various delicate nuances, if I may use that term. The *Daily Worker* is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy giving directives to the conspirators.

MR. MORRIS On individuals?

MR. BUDENZ On individuals likewise. It was a matter of political life and death to have a correct viewpoint of the various individuals who were dealt with by the *Daily Worker*.

SENATOR FERGUSON And it had to be accurate for you to carry on; is that correct?

MR. BUDENZ Communist information among themselves is absolutely accurate. It must be. It is the foundation of their work.

SENATOR FERGUSON You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?

MR. BUDENZ This is an official communication between leaders of the conspiracy.

SENATOR FERGUSON Among themselves?

MR. BUDENZ That is right.

Although this interrogation of Budenz covered the same accusations against Lattimore that had been covered in his interrogation by the Tydings Committee, the presentation resembled more closely the development of a prosecutor's case than an attempt to evaluate the accuracy of a story. These hearings, unlike the Tydings Committee hearings, provided no counterbalance at all to the

dominant tone of complete confidence in Budenz's veracity. For example, the evidence on the onion-skin documents was given without the slightest indication that it had been seriously questioned by witnesses heard by the Tydings Committee. The only questions asked related to whether Lattimore's designation in these documents was an indication of his importance in the Communist movement.

Although the testimony adverse to Budenz in the Tydings Committee hearings was not specifically referred to, Budenz's testimony before the McCarran Committee suggested at several points an effort to repair the damage that had been done by what was said earlier. For example, Budenz stated that the use of onion-skin documents terminated in 1940 or 1941. He had not so stated before the Tydings Committee. Whether this was a fresh piece of recollection we cannot, of course, judge. It served, among other purposes, the useful office of undercutting the testimony of Dr. Bella Dodd that she had never seen such documents, since she did not, by her own account, join the Communist Party until 1943. Rather, it would have served that function if any reference had been made to Dr. Dodd's impeaching testimony. There was none, nor was there any reference to the even more damaging testimony of Earl Browder.

In the friendly and deferential atmosphere of the IPR hearings, Budenz became considerably more expansive and less guarded in his statements. For example, he had told the Tydings Committee that Communists had infiltrated the IPR to a considerable extent. Under the friendly questioning of Mr. Robert Morris, counsel for the subcommittee, Budenz took a more categorical position:

MR. MORRIS Now, Mr. Budenz, from the eyes of the then editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, what was your opinion of the Institute of Pacific Relations? What did you know of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. BUDENZ What I know is perhaps the better way to put it, because I was at Politburo meetings and in consultation with members of the Politburo constantly. As a matter of fact, day by day I was in consultation. And frequently I was at Politburo meetings because of my position. The Politburo in these discussions declared the Institute of Pacific Relations repeatedly to be a captive organization, completely under control of the Communist Party.

MR. MORRIS You say the Institute of Pacific Relations was a captive organization?

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MR. BUDENZ That is correct.
MR. MORRIS Completely under the control of the Communist Party?
MR. BUDENZ That is correct.

He related a colorful anecdote to emphasize the closeness of the relationship between the Communist Party and the IPR:

MR. MORRIS Mr. Budenz, would you say there was a cell, a Communist cell, operating within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. BUDENZ Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Alexander Trachtenberg, in these Political Bureau discussions, emphasizing the importance of the work of this cell, described the Institute of Pacific Relations as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East."

MR. MORRIS I wonder if you would tell us who Alexander Trachtenberg is, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ Alexander Trachtenberg is one of the most important members of the Communist conspiracy in this country. He is the cultural commissar of the Communists in this country. He has published all the authorized works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and all other works authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. Through his hands these works have to go. He is technically the head of International Publishers, but he is vested with much more authority, with reference to the Daily Worker. He is in charge of the whole cultural work of the Party, or at least he was when I was in the Party.

MR. MORRIS And is it your testimony that the Communists use the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence foreign policy?

MR. BUDENZ That is right.

SENATOR FERGUSON Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Budenz, that when a man like Trachtenberg is speaking about this being an educational process, this IPR, here in Washington—and I take it that is what is meant by the "little red schoolhouse"—that this was an actual fact, that he knew what he was talking about, because of his ties in the whole Communist activity?

MR. BUDENZ Yes, sir; and because he knew it through the reports which were received from the Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations, largely through Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Note that Budenz gave stature to the "little red schoolhouse" characterization by emphasizing the importance of Trachtenberg. Throughout the record of these hearings there is ample indication of Trachtenberg's key role in the formulation and dissemination of Party ideology. It is surprising that Budenz did not emphasize Trachtenberg's role—indeed, he hardly mentioned it—in his testimony before the Tydings Committee. One wonders why the

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"little red schoolhouse" anecdote lay dormant in his mind for so long.

In Budenz's testimony on the relationship between Party membership and the activities of so-called Communist-front organizations, an exchange occurred which is illustrative of the tenor of the questioning in this hearing:

MR. BUDENZ As I have said, to my knowledge 95 percent of the members of the Communist-front organizations are actually Communists, and the other 10 percent are thrown in there to give that appearance or that uncertainty of connection with the Communist movement.

MR. SOURWINE Pardon me, Mr. Budenz. You have 105 percent. Will you settle for 90 and 10?
MR. BUDENZ I would say it was 5 and 95 percent.

Mr. Sourwine was counsel to the parent Senate Judiciary Committee and shared with Mr. Morris, special counsel to the subcommittee, the conduct of the IPR hearings. His tone throughout, like Mr. Morris's, was one of violent hostility to witnesses accused of Communist affiliation, and of almost obsequious deference to their accusers. His action on the occasion quoted above is characteristic. He contented himself with tying up Budenz's arithmetic and did not ask (nor did anyone else) for the basis of Budenz's rather surprising statement. As we shall see, Mr. Sourwine was not so complaisant in questioning witnesses whom he regarded as hostile.

The most important new development in Budenz's testimony was the elaboration on a subject that had received only passing mention during the Tydings Committee hearings. This was Vice-President Henry Wallace's mission to China in 1944, on which he was accompanied by Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent. Ironically enough, this new aspect of Budenz's testimony occasioned a far sharper challenge to his credibility than anything that occurred in the more skeptical atmosphere of the Tydings Committee hearings. Although its factual setting is complex, the controversy is worth examining.

It started, quietly enough, with a repetition of the charge that in 1944 Stachel had told Budenz to consider Lattimore a Communist. This time, however, the occasion for that remark was more fully described.

MR. BUDENZ 1944, the trip of Vice-President Henry Wallace. I don't

know whether I can emphasize the importance of this trip to the Communists as much as it should be. It received a very great attention from the Politburo and it was constantly brought to my attention by Jack Stachel as the representative of the Politburo as a very important mission, which would redound to the benefit of the Communist cause in the Far East.

In that respect a great deal of dependence was placed on Owen Lattimore, whom I was told by Mr. Stachel at that time to consider a Communist—

MR. MORRIS What do you mean, "consider a Communist"? Is that a technical word or are you using?

MR. BUDENZ That was a technical term we used which meant he was an authority from the Communist viewpoint. He was a Marxist authority.

MR. MORRIS Was that warning given to you by anyone else at that time?

MR. BUDENZ Well, there were many other references of similar character. I remember specifically Stachel's because my relations with him were very close and he was constantly giving me these instructions.

I do know that similar statements were made within the Politburo itself by other members in connection with Wallace's trip.

MR. BUDENZ . . . Now, in order to be advised of such things as that, we were to rely on anything Lattimore might say or do that we would be aware of.

MR. SOURWINE You mean that in connection with the Wallace mission the word was passed by the use of the phrase "consider him as a Communist," that with respect to that mission Mr. Lattimore might not be setting the line; he was giving the line, and he was interpreting that mission in Communist terms?

MR. BUDENZ That's correct. He was a representative of the Party in the Wallace mission.

SENATOR SMITH He was sort of a VIP in the movement?
MR. BUDENZ That's right.

The emphasis was still, however, on the significance of what Stachel said about Lattimore rather than the significance of the work in which Lattimore was engaged. Later on the same day, Budenz charged for the first time that the Wallace mission was guided by the Communist viewpoint, naming Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, a State Department specialist in Far Eastern affairs, as the Communist agents who directed the Wallace mission toward Com-

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munist objectives. It should be noted that Budenz was asked about Vincent during an executive session of the Tydings Committee and at that time stated that he was not prepared to identify Vincent as a Communist.

After this testimony by Budenz, the newspaper columnist Joseph Alsop charged that the attack on the Wallace mission was, to his personal knowledge, unfounded. At the time of the mission, Alsop was aide to General Clair Chennault, Commander of the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force in China. He was in daily contact with Wallace and his aides while Wallace was in Kunning. Alsop wrote that the principal result of the Wallace mission was a cabled recommendation to President Roosevelt that the American commander in China, General Stilwell, be replaced. Stilwell was violently hostile to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government and favorably disposed toward the Chinese Communists, whom he regarded as the only effective force that could be deployed against the Japanese, at this time everywhere triumphant on the Chinese mainland. This recommendation, which was followed by the replacement of Stilwell with Wedemeyer, was regarded by Alsop as a "profoundly anti-Communist act" which clearly demonstrated that the Wallace mission was not Communist-directed and that John Carter Vincent, who concurred in the recommendation, was not a Communist.

After the publication of the Alsop column, the committee recalled Budenz to the witness stand for the specific purpose of reviewing his testimony about the Wallace mission. He was shown the text of the Kunning cables and asked to comment on them in his role as an expert on the Communist Party line. First he reviewed those portions of the cables that reported on Wallace's conversations with Chiang and on the general situation in China at the time. The following passage shows the tenor of his examination:

MR. MORRIS Would you read each paragraph that you address yourself to, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ Yes. The first paragraph is in message I: "The discussion between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement."

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MR. MORRIS Is that an anti-Communist expression, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ Most decidedly not. It helps the Communists. If some person visiting the United States, of a diplomatic character, were to be represented to the American authorities today as prejudiced against the Communists, that would be of a kind, except that in this case Chiang Kai-shek has had civil war on his hands for a number of years, and Chiang Kai-shek's experience shows that he could not trust the Communists, and events proved he was correct.

MR. MORRIS Will you address yourself to the second point in that cable, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ The second point is the sentence: "I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia." This was the first point in the Communist drive at that time, in their literature and in the discussions with the Politburo. The necessity for what they called Russian-Chinese friendship.

And that was an authority purchasable, when you come realistically to consider it, only by the Chinese Communists coming to the front in China. That is what they understood.

Incidentally, this isn't exactly what the Communists were stressing at that time.

SENATOR FERGUSON You feel no nation that is anti-Communist could have friendly relations with Russia?

MR. BUDENZ I think history has proved it is impossible.

SENATOR FERGUSON So a friendly relationship between China and Russia, real friendly relations, would have to be on the basis of both being Communist?

MR. BUDENZ That is correct.

The implication of this testimony was that Wallace was led by his pro-Communist advisers, Vincent and Lattimore, to take a pro-Communist position in reporting to the President. Without anticipating later testimony that raised some doubt about the accuracy of Budenz's conclusion, it may be pointed out that in mid-1944 the proposition that a Sino-Russian understanding was vital to the successful prosecution of the war against Japan was hardly the exclusive property of the Communists.

After reviewing the reportorial portions of the Kunning cables, Budenz turned his attention to the recommendation that Stilwell be replaced by Wedemeyer. He did not discuss Stilwell's well-known anti-Chiang and pro-Chinese Communist proclivities, but instead attempted to reconcile the facts with his position by asserting that the American Communist line regarded the replacement as a "good compromise."

MR. BUDENZ There is also a reference here to General Wedemeyer.
MR. MORRIS Yes. Will you address yourself to that, Mr. Budenz?
MR. BUDENZ Yes, sir.

General Wedemeyer, when he first came into public attention was not opposed by the Communists. Indeed, the Communists felt that the compromise made with Wedemeyer was a good compromise. They were not opposed to Wedemeyer. They thought he was nonpolitical.

MR. BUDENZ The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all.

MR. BUDENZ . . . What I wish to say is that General Wedemeyer in 1944 was not unacceptable to the Communists. Indeed, to a certain degree, they thought he was a good compromise, since it excluded General Chennault.

Budenz's testimony on the Communist view of the Wallace mission was summarized in this exchange with Senator Ferguson near the conclusion of his testimony:

SENATOR FERGUSON I would just go back now to the first part that asked about.

Again, you have testified before this committee and gave your reasons this morning for your belief that your testimony was true and accurate, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Do you now again say that it was?

MR. BUDENZ I say it with more assurance than ever, because these documents I presented, as I have said, are only part of what could have been presented to this committee, and they confirm my contention, which was that the Communist Party Politburo, from its vantage point, thought that the Wallace Mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end in the way the world would end.

We have to appreciate what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.

SENATOR FERGUSON Do you feel their objective was carried out?
MR. BUDENZ Absolutely, it was carried out.

On the basis of this concisely statement, Alsop wrote to the committee asserting that Budenz's testimony was untruthful as requesting an opportunity to be heard. On October 18, 1951, he appeared before the committee. The substance of his testimony will be considered shortly. First, however, a word must be said about the difficulties of extracting that substance. Rarely in the

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annals of Congressional inquiry has a witness been subjected to so much badgering. Indeed, the most striking parallel is probably the treatment of Lattimore himself by the same committee. Every possible effort was made, both by counsel and by the members of the committee, to blurt the edge of Alsop's testimony and to minimize the conflict between his firsthand account of what occurred at Kunning and Budenz's testimony as to why the Wallace mission was pro-Communist. Among many examples that might be cited, the following exchange between Alsop and Mr. Sourwine illustrates the tendentious nature of the questioning and the enormous effort made to prevent the creation of a clear-cut issue of credibility between Budenz and Alsop:

MR. SOURWINE If you are challenging Mr. Budenz's statement that the Politburo was misled with the guidance given Mr. Wallace, is it not necessary, in order for you to successfully challenge that, to show that there was nothing accomplished by Mr. Lattimore and/or Mr. Vincent which was in favor of the Communists.

Do you feel you can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz's statement by showing that Mr. Wallace did something that was not in complete accord with the Communist line?

MR. ALSOP I think I can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz's statement by showing that the chief result—

MR. SOURWINE No, answer my question.

MR. ALSOP I am trying to answer your question.

MR. SOURWINE You are not trying to answer it; you are trying to evade it.

MR. ALSOP I am not trying to evade it. If you will allow me to complete my sentence, I believe you will find I am trying to answer it.

SENATOR SMITH Will the reporter read the question back?
(The question was read back by the reporter.)

MR. ALSOP I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that if you can show the main result of the Wallace mission was a profoundly anti-Communist act, you successfully challenge Mr. Budenz's evidence.

MR. SOURWINE Not unless you show that everything Mr. Wallace did was the result of the influence of Mr. Vincent or Mr. Lattimore. If Mr. Wallace did anything independently on his own, if he was not a complete stooge of the Communists or a Communist agent—and no one is alleging that and no one has alleged it—then what you have just said is not the logical fact.

MR. ALSOP Mr. Vincent participated and joined in this recommendation for the dismissal of General Stilwell. This was the extent of guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace.

MR. SOURWINE That is different testimony. If that was the complete extent of the guidance Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace, then you are coming around to the theory which was advanced, to wit, that there

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was nothing accomplished which would have been pleasing to the Communists.

MR. ALSOP If you will excuse me, Mr. Sourwine, I am saying what was accomplished with Mr. Vincent's participation and concurrence was profoundly displeasing to the Communists.

MR. SOURWINE Put it this way: If Mr. Vincent through his influence on Mr. Wallace accomplished anything which was pleasing to the Communists, then Mr. Budenz's statement cannot be said to be perjury. Is that not accurate?

MR. ALSOP Could you repeat that? You are getting so complicated Mr. Sourwine, I did not understand your question.

SENATOR SMITH I am certain I do not understand either one of you. Do you want the question read back, Mr. Sourwine?

MR. SOURWINE I do not desire it.

SENATOR SMITH Will the reporter read it back?
(The question was read by the reporter.)

MR. ALSOP I would not say that that was accurate because it is a substantial disproof of Mr. Budenz's statement that Mr. Vincent guided Mr. Wallace toward the Communist objective. The principal guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace was toward a profound anti-Communist objective.

MR. SOURWINE There was no named objective, was there, Mr. Alsop?

MR. ALSOP Well, Mr. Sourwine, what I am trying to show is that the main result of Mr. Wallace's mission was profoundly anti-Communist.

I think if you will permit me to proceed with the presentation of the very large quantity of documentation that I have, you will be convinced.

MR. SOURWINE Do you contend that Mr. Wallace's mission and its results were controlled entirely and shaped entirely by Mr. Vincent?

MR. ALSOP I do not so contend. I think Mr. Budenz grossly exaggerated in that report.

MR. SOURWINE If Mr. Vincent did not control what Mr. Wallace did then nothing that Mr. Wallace did can be attributed to Mr. Vincent's influence, can it?

MR. ALSOP That is a question to me, Mr. Sourwine?

MR. SOURWINE Yes, sir.

MR. ALSOP I cannot possibly agree with that because Mr. Vincent did in fact join in guiding Mr. Wallace or influencing Mr. Wallace toward a profoundly anti-Communist act. This is the essence of the whole situation.

This exchange, culminating in what we might call the "Sourwine fork," may be a prime example of debater's technique, but is sure not what ought to be expected in an impartial fact-finding inquiry.

* Italics mine.

Whether Mr. Sourwine's efforts were successful can be determined only after an examination of the substance of Alsop's testimony, to which we now turn.

We can briefly dispose of the issue of the reportorial portions of the Kunming cable, which Budenz characterized as being pro-Communist. Budenz implied that this material was inserted in the cables because of the pro-Communist influence of Vincent and Lattimore. Alsop testified that Lattimore had nothing to do with the cables and that, far from being pro-Communist, the cables simply contained an accurate description of the situation in China at the time and contained no statement which indicated a pro-Communist bias. So far, there might be thought to be nothing to choose between these opposing contentions, both being based on the opinions of their respective proponents. But Alsop went further and asserted that he himself was the author of the passages that Budenz characterized as pro-Communist.

The more important issue relates to the recommendation that General Stilwell be replaced by General Wedemeyer. It will be recalled that Budenz testified that this was viewed by the Communists as a "good compromise," since their objective was to prevent the appointment of General Chennault in General Stilwell's place. With respect to this assertion, as demonstrative of the malignantly pro-Communist nature of the advice that John Carter Vincent allegedly gave to Wallace, Alsop's testimony can only be characterized as devastating. After testifying that Vincent strongly concurred in the view that Wallace should recommend Stilwell's dismissal, Alsop testified as follows:

MR. ALSOP I also have a rather vivid recollection as to how General Wedemeyer came to be suggested for Stilwell's replacement. In brief, Mr. Wallace's first idea was to recommend General Chennault, of whom the Generalissimo had spoken to him highly and by whom he had been much impressed.

I looked to Mr. Vincent, hoping that he might interpose some objection to this suggestion of my own boss; but he went along with Mr. Wallace. That is why I remember Mr. Vincent's view on this thing.

So, it was left to me, who had served General Chennault since before Pearl Harbor, to oppose General Chennault's nomination as commander in chief in China. I had two reasons for doing so.

First, only General Chennault knew how to run an air force on a shoestring. Our shoestring was getting very thin. In those days

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the Fourteenth Air Force was the sole force in being to prevent through military distinction in China. As Mr. Wallace later put it in this cable, General Chennault was needed on the job he was doing.

Second, and more important, General Stilwell had gone to very great lengths to blacken General Chennault's name at the Pentagon. Even if President Roosevelt decided to act on Wallace's recommendation, there was no hope at all that the President could ever persuade the Army and Air Staff to put General Chennault in Stilwell's place.

General Wedemeyer, who had great influence at the Pentagon, later I believe recommended General Chennault's promotion to lieutenant general, and it was refused.

The recommendation to recall Stilwell was certain to make enough row all by itself. If this recommendation was coupled with a nomination of General Chennault, the roof was quite sure to blow off. Hence, Mr. Wallace's idea was self-defeating.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent accepted these practical arguments of mine as being compelling, and thus it was I who "enjoined General Chennault," to quote Mr. Budenz, and meanwhile the alleged Communist, Mr. Vincent, in fact approved the suggestion of this man whom "the Communists were very much opposed to and did not want at all," to quote Mr. Budenz again.

With General Chennault out of the picture, General Wedemeyer, whom I had seen in action when he visited Chungking in his then capacity as Lord Louis Mountbatten's deputy, was at length decided on. Thus Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable was at last roughed out in this discussion with Wallace, Vincent, and me. We drafted it together. I had a typewriter in the house and did the typing.

After Mr. Wallace signed it, the cable was sent through the consulates in Kunming, if I remember correctly. Mr. Wallace does not know how it was sent, as far as I recall. I took the signed draft off.

This was the way the accused man, Mr. Vincent, "guided" Mr. Wallace "along the path" of the Party line.

Again I ask the committee to weigh Mr. Budenz' wholly unsupported testimony as to Mr. Vincent against these facts which I have presented.

Again I say it is not I who convicts Mr. Budenz of untruth; it is the facts that convict him.

The committee was not impressed with Alsop's assertion that the events he narrated demonstrated that Budenz had falsely accused John Carter Vincent of being a Communist. The ensuing questioning brought out the obvious point that Alsop had no personal knowledge whether Vincent was a Communist or not. Senator Smith of North Carolina then commented as follows:

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SENATOR SMITH I think you have answered it, and I think it is all right if that is what you said. Mr. Budenz made a statement. As I understood it, you challenged it, but now you say you did not have any personal knowledge of it, so that leaves it just where it was.

The implication is clear: There is no way to refute the testimony of Budenz when he says that X is a Communist. Budenz's testimony is inherently superior because he was once a Communist himself. The point is clearly made in another exchange between Alsop and Senator Smith.

SENATOR SMITH You are correct that you could not prove that he was not a Communist, but Mr. Budenz, assuming he was truthful when he testified that Mr. Vincent was a Communist, could come nearer knowing if he himself was a member and they worked together than you could come near not knowing.

MR. ALSOP Mr. Chairman, you are a former president, I believe, of the American Bar Association. What would be your judgment? Unsupported allegation for which not one shred of documentary evidence has been introduced stands on one side, and on the other side there is a mass of documentary evidence that the man behaved in the most contrary manner possible to that indicated by the unsupported allegation.

SENATOR SMITH That is a matter of judgment, but if Mr. Budenz knew for a fact that he and Mr. Vincent were Communists, that they belonged to the same group, they swapped information, they consulted about Communist matters, whatever they did—I am not saying what is or is not because I do not know—but if Mr. Budenz said he was, people may not believe Mr. Budenz, you may not believe him and others may not believe him, but that is some evidence, at least, that Mr. Vincent was, according to what he said.

MR. ALSOP I say the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against Mr. Budenz.

SENATOR SMITH That is your judgment. It may be mine.

Despite the deference and solicitude with which Budenz was treated in the IPR hearings, the conflict between his testimony and that of Alsop (a presumably disinterested witness) produces a feeling of doubt. That doubt may not extend to his sincerity, although some may think that too is questionable, but it does encompass the important issue of his knowledgeability. The residual impression is that on this occasion Budenz may have been too eager to opine on a matter about which his information was incomplete and inaccurate. Since no one has come forward to challenge Alsop's account of what took place at Kunming, and since

Communists or anyone else, was more often than not to be found advocating positions on Far Eastern policy with which the Communists were in accord.

This judgment is in marked contrast to the conclusions of both the Tydings Committee and the IPR Committee, although it more nearly approaches the former than the latter. Pertinent extracts from both are given below. Their significance, for our purposes, is less a matter of which one was "right" than it is to demonstrate how easy it is for much the same evidence to be varying interpreted, in ways that depend on the bias of the observer.

The Tydings Committee concluded:

We find no evidence to support the charge that Owen Lattimore is the "top Russian spy" or, for that matter, any other sort of spy. Even the testimony of Louis F. Budenz, if given the fullest weight and import, could establish no more than the Communists used Lattimore to project a propaganda line against China.

... We do not find that Mr. Lattimore's writings follow the Communist or any other line, save as his very consistent position on the Far East may be called the Lattimore line.

... Perhaps in many of his contacts, Mr. Lattimore has not exercised the discretion which our knowledge of Communism in 1950 indicates would have been wise, but we are impelled to comment that in no instance has Mr. Lattimore on the evidence before us been shown to have knowingly associated with Communists.

We would be remiss in not commenting on the manner in which the charges against Owen Lattimore have been presented. As in the case of other phases of our inquiry, we have seen a distortion of the facts of such a magnitude as to be truly alarming. Unfortunately, until now, it has been largely, these distortions that have been before the American people.

The IPR Committee concluded:

Owen Lattimore was, from some time beginning in the 1930's, a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.

As might be expected, the two committees also differed sharply in their evaluation of Budenz's testimony. The Tydings Committee set forth a careful summary of the Budenz charges and of the contradictory evidence adduced by Browder, Dodd, and others. Their general conclusions were summed up in the following paragraph in the report:

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The subcommittee notes that the testimony of Mr. Budenz is in the nature of hearsay in that his evidence against Lattimore is founded on what he states he was told by or learned from others, identified as Communists. The subcommittee also notes that only since this investigation and the publicity concerning Lattimore in connection therewith has Budenz given information to the FBI concerning Lattimore, even though Budenz has been reporting for several years to the FBI on various Communist activities and personalities. We feel that there is significance in the fact that Budenz, at the time of preparing his *Collier's* article, to which reference has been made, did not present Lattimore in the same light that he did at the time he testified before us. Similarly in the case of Haldore Hanson, Budenz admitted that Hanson was named by him as a Communist for the first time during the course of our proceedings. Both Lattimore and Hanson would seem to have been such logical subjects for a report by Budenz to some Government agency that his failure to make such a report is necessarily puzzling, particularly in view of the fact that he reported them after the extensive publicity given the matter in the course of the McCarthy charges. While we understand that Mr. Budenz may have been unable to furnish detailed background material, it is regretted that he did not at least submit the names of these individuals to an agency of the Government before our proceedings. We recall in opinion that Budenz has been used as a witness by the Government in other cases where his testimony was not hearsay and was corroborated. Here, of course, his testimony is hearsay and corroboration is, to a very great extent, lacking. This observation is necessarily not a reflection upon Mr. Budenz' veracity inasmuch as his testimony related to what he was told by Communists about whose veracity there is some doubt.

The IPR Committee, on the other hand, did not undertake an evaluation of Budenz's testimony. Indeed, the references to his testimony in the 225-page report are surprisingly sparse. When he is referred to, there is merely a statement of what he said with no attempt to provide an appraisal. Surprisingly enough, there is no extended treatment of the hotly contested issue of the Wallace mission, which has been described above. While the incident is referred to in a brief passage, there is no suggestion that Budenz's testimony was in any way challenged, and Alsop's name is not even mentioned. From this omission, and from the report's failure to deal at all with the problems created by the Budenz testimony, it seems clear that Budenz's testimony, even when challenged, was taken by the committee as expressing immutable truth.

Perhaps the major problem raised by the testimony of Louis Budenz is what he means when he calls a person a Communist. Once it is recognized that the source of his information is almost

cerning the line which the Institute of Pacific Relations ought to follow". Under these circumstances it is scarcely surprising to find that the IPR served as agents, spies and agents provocateurs for its principal supporters, the Rockefeller Empire and Soviet Russia. Proverbially, "the man who plays the pipe calls the tune". The Soviets called the tune mightily insistently, as is evidenced by the pilgrimage of Owen Lattimore, editor of IPR publications, and Roosevelt's and the New Deal State Department's "top authority on the Far East," to Chinese Communist headquarters in Yenan. This was reported, quoting Senator McCarthy's report to Congress (C.R. 8/30/50, p. 4446), in

"... an article by Philip J. Jaffe entitled 'CHINESE COMMUNISTS TOLD ME' which appeared in the NEW MASSES of October 12, 1937. "In this article Jaffe gives considerable detail about his travels in China with T. A. Bissan and Owen Lattimore, giving details as to their stay at the Communist Foreign Office at Yenan, and being greeted on their arrival at Communist headquarters by Agnes Smedley."

This devotion of the IPR to the interests of the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis, however, did not preclude its serving also as an espionage agency in other directions, especially when it served the interests of its masters. Correspondence of the IPR seized in the barn of E. C. Carter's country home at Lee, Mass., throws interesting light on such espionage. The records make it clear that the IPR was the center of a vast espionage ring, serving the interests of its masters, as they might vary, following each twist and turn of the Party line. Orders were issued disposing of a vast number of agents, from Owen Lattimore and Philip Jessup up and down the line. They indicate that the IPR played its part in the network of Rockefeller agencies, in engineering the precipitation of World War II and our involvement in it.

Thus in a letter from E. C. Carter, secretary general of the IPR, to William W. Lockwood, one of the editors of *Americasia* who was active in numerous Communist fronts, including the National People's Committee Against Hearst and the Amer-

ican Committee for International Studies, and Director of the Woodrow Wilson Institute, Princeton University, is a discussion of "basic work (by) many groups and individuals" in the international field that clearly is a combination of espionage and propaganda, which it is suggested could be enhanced by the following assignments:

- "Bring over E. H. Tawney so that he may appraise, criticize and interpret the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of the plans of other serious groups on this continent.
- "Bring Ushiba, Saionji or Yokota in order that we may have someone from the very insides of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese army, the bureaucracies and the universities.
- "Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom, Tawney and others and hold him here until a week before America enters the war..."

Saionji was a key member of Sorge's Red spy ring. These letters make it clear that Rockefeller's IPR controlled the spy ring that instigated the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that they knew in advance, to the very day, when it would occur and involve us in the war.

Von Trott is more adequately identified by Carter in a letter to Owen Lattimore on October 23, 1940, as one of their agents, as follows:

"Adam von Trott has found that the best way of advancing the interests of the IPR these difficult days in Germany has been to join the staff of the Foreign Office to promote Far Eastern studies. As a member of the Foreign Office, therefore, he is ineligible to be a member of the international secretariat and his name should be deleted from the last pages of *Pacific Affairs*."

The treatment that Carter suggested extending to Russia was entirely different:

"Send Harriet Moore to the USSR to go through all government party writing in postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and Politburo chiefs. In the case of Russia it was not a matter of espionage

age but conferring and receiving instructions and orders through a trusted war horse of the Party. The regard in which the Kremlin held the IPR espionage activities was related by a former Communist general on the basis of conversations in 1935-1936 with a top general in the Soviet intelligence, in an affidavit that Sen. Joseph McCarthy gave the FBI and Congress (C.R. 8/30/51, p. 4445):

"The thing that particularly disturbed Russian intelligence was that they had difficulty in getting Russian agents into the Far East because of the suspicion of the Japanese and the Chinese at that time... the head of the Russian intelligence told... that they were having excellent success through the Institute of Pacific Relations, which the Soviet intelligence, through Communists in the United States, had taken over. In connection with this he particularly mentioned Owen Lattimore and another individual... The (later) individual has not been connected with the State Department, but did spend some time with Lattimore in the OWI..."

"The former Red army general's... testimony will further be that in the course of visits to other European capitals, he had received approximately the same information about the IPR and also about Lattimore..."

When it served the interests of its masters, the IPR did not hesitate to act for other foreign powers, as in the preparation of Japan for its attack on Pearl Harbor. It served the conspirators well by forcing the U.S. into World War II without a declaration of war by Congress. This story is well told in an article entitled IPR-TOKYO AXIS by Shepard Marley, that appeared in the December 1946 issue of *PLAIN TALK* and is quoted from the Congressional Record of March 30, 1950. (p. 4462):

later, took a deep interest in his country's IPR chapter. He put his personal trusted aides into the key posts in the Japanese IPR, which was supported largely with funds contributed by the very industrialists who helped the militarists plan and carry out wars of aggression throughout the Pacific area. It was Konoye who had ordered the preparation of a report explaining Japan's need for expansion because of population pressure. This report was read to the IPR international conference of 1936, which was held in Yosemite National Park, in California.

"The chief secretary of the Japan Council of the IPR, according to Mr. Kelley in the Herald Tribune, was Tomohiko Ushiba, Konoye's private secretary. Through Ushiba, Prince Konoye kept in touch with Edward C. Carter, then chief of the IPR's international secretariat, so that he could keep watch on American State Department policies. Far-Eastern experts, such as abound in the IPR, must surely have known that Prince Konoye was among the leading exponents of Japanese aggression for many years before Pearl Harbor. Yet there is no evidence that the Institute ever took any steps to prevent its use as a front for the dissemination of propaganda in the United States and for the gathering of inside political and military information about this country.

"Considering the semi-official status which the IPR has acquired in the policy-making branches of the Federal Government, the Congress owes it to the country to investigate the history of the organization, its obscure foreign links, its unduly complex administrative set-up, and its alliances with pro-Soviet and pro-Communist elements both at home and abroad.

"The intricate nature of the administrative set-up of the Institute makes it ideal for control by a few well placed persons. Small wonder then that many of its leading and most prolific writers are dependable fellow travelers who faithfully follow the tortuous path Stalin sets—even if they have to slow down around the sharp turns of Soviet policy.

"The Institute's activity seldom reaches any large section of the public directly, and few persons know that it exists. It is doubtful if 1 out of 1,000 of the parents of boys who fought their way across the Pacific, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, has ever heard of this organization. Yet in Government circles, including those where America's high policy in the Pacific is determined, the influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been enormous and is apparently growing.

"During the recent war, the Institute supplied many agencies with experts on the Far East. Four IPR staff members worked for the China section of the UNRRA. Three others did research for MacArthur's headquarters on Japanese reconstruction. William L. Holland was the head of the OWI in China. Owen Lattimore was President Roosevelt's gift to Chiang Kai-shek for a time and President Truman's special adviser to MacArthur as well as Far Eastern head of OWI. The IPR supplied lesser lights to the OWI, OSS, and the State Department. Not all of these workers who joined Government agencies were Communists or fellow travelers. The IPR, however, frequently provided research specialists who were interested mainly in the furthering of Stalin's aims in the Far East.

"Many IPR trustees reached positions of considerable importance. In 1941, Lauchlin Currie was President Roosevelt's special emissary to China. William C. Johnston worked on a special assignment for the State Department. George E. Taylor was director of the OWI's Far Eastern Section and later in the State Department's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. Benjamin Kiser, (former editor of *AMERASIA*) a Spokane lawyer, headed the UNRRA in China.

"The Institute's aid to the Government was not limited to supplying experts of varying degrees, for the Government bought 750,000 IPR pamphlets for soldiers in the Pacific and Asiatic theatres. Schools, too, have been influenced by IPR publications, especially the

series published jointly with the Webster Co. of St. Louis, designed for a 14-year-old reading level. In three and a half years this series sold over a million copies.

"Another way in which the IPR influences public opinion is through the newspapers and periodical press. As the IPR itself does not tire of saying, no one seems to know anything about the Far East. The harried editorial writer is immeasurably pleased, then, when he sees on his desk a neat publicity release and a copy of an article on some aspect of Chinese politics which he can now proceed to discuss.

"Like most associations into which the Communists and fellow travelers have moved, the IPR reveals certain inconsistencies and peculiarities of policy that can be explained only by the ideological affiliations of its most important figures.

"Operating more cleverly in IPR than in most groups they have entered, the Communists and their friends have been able to keep the reputation of this outfit pretty clean. But evidence of their work is easily noted when one takes the IPR material in bulk and breaks it down into two types—the controversial and noncontroversial. What has buffaloesd most readers of IPR books, pamphlets, and periodicals is that so much of the stuff is of a very scholarly nature, not at all on subjects that arouse the emotions any more readily than do articles on Chinese pottery. Yet in the last decade or so at least two out of every three articles in IPR's two journals—*Pacific Affairs*, quarterly, and *Far Eastern Survey*, bi-weekly—on such hot subjects as Chinese politics, the Soviet Union, and the general political situation in the Far East, with respect to those two countries and the United States, have been written by such staunch defenders of Stalin as T. A. Bissan, Owen Lattimore, Harriet Moore, Laurence Salisbury, and others not too numerous to mention in due time.

"It may be claimed that by selecting excerpts and quoting out of context any writer can be shown to believe almost anything. This is

frequently true. Yet the weight of the evidence that links the IPR to the Communist line is too great to pass off with such platitudes. The writings of the fellow travelers and outright Communists in IPR publications constitute only a small part of the total IPR material—but they constitute its most vital part, and they deal with the subjects that are most significant for American foreign policy, international relations, and public education."

The key personnel of the American Council of the IPR who are represented as giving leadership to the entire organization, comprised what Louis F. Budenz exposed as a Communist cell. This cell constituted the backbone of *AMERASIA*, which in reality was one of the subsidiary publications of the IPR. This cell, according to Budenz, included Frederick Vanderbilt Field who, he stated, was to his knowledge a "Soviet espionage agent", and Owen Lattimore, both members of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations. Lattimore, according to Budenz's testimony, was

"... commended (at a meeting of the American Politburo) by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Earl Browder for the fact that he had been responsible for placing a number of Communist writers in the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations of which he was then editor.

"In 1937... at a meeting called by Earl Browder, it was brought forward that we were now under instructions not to name the Chinese Communists as Red Communists, but we were to begin to represent them, as Browder said, as 'North Dakota Non-Farmer Leaguers'.

"Field was present at that meeting and made a report, at which he commended Mr. Lattimore's zeal in seeing that Communists were placed as writers in 'Pacific Affairs'. Mr. Browder also referred to that, and it was agreed that Mr. Lattimore should be given general direction for organizing the writers representing the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers..."

"... at a regular meeting of the Politburo, at which Mr. Browder was present (in 1943) it was officially reported that Mr.

Lattimore, through Mr. Field, had received word from the apparatus that there was to be a change of line on Chiang Kai-shek.

"It was decided that the line was to attack Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, an article was discussed to be put in one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations—and it did so appear—by T. A. Bissan, declaring that Nationalist China was feudal China, and that Red China was democratic China."

Other subversives and fellow travelers identified with the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis and associated with Lattimore, Field, Carter, Bissan, all of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations, include:

Alger Hiss, now in jail (instead of executed) where he ought to be joined by his sponsors and accomplices, convicted of perjury in connection with treason; and a member of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations.

Philip C. Jessup, who was chairman of the Pacific Council of the IPR in the years 1938-42, when the scheme was hatched for turning over China and Asia to the Soviets in accord with the purposes of the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis; who as Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and as Ambassador-at-Large has played a stellar role in carrying out the conspiracy; and who is a member of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations. Lauchlin Currie, who as assistant and adviser to President Roosevelt, played the important role that has been recounted, has been named by ex-Communist spy courier Elizabeth Bentley as one of her sources of important espionage data; and who is a member of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations, and employed as "adviser" to the Republic of Colombia.

Philip Jaffe, Lattimore's fellow editor of *Americasia*, who pleaded guilty to charges regarding secret records and was fined a mere \$2500; uncle of the wife of one of China's top rank Communists, who was Lattimore's IPR confidential secretary; and himself labelled a Communist agent by Budenz. Lt. Andrew Roth, a liaison officer at the

State Department from Naval Intelligence, who was associated with Jaffe in the *AMERASIA* case, but was never prosecuted therefor. Subsequently he was provided by the State Department with an American passport and went to Asia to engage in pro-Communist, anti-American propaganda.

John Stewart Service, pupil of Owen Lattimore, pro-Communist aid to General Stilwell, who in 1945 was ordered out by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley; who on his return was arrested for complicity in the *Americasia* affair and secret documents together with Jaffe and Roth, but was never prosecuted therefor; who was subsequently assigned to a post of strategic value to the conspirators, State Department Foreign Service officer in India, merely to be recalled for a rehearsing of his case, on the basis of charges made by Senator McCarthy, by the Loyalty Review Board in 1950, cleared by it once again, but relieved of his post in 1951 and finally ousted.

John Carter Vincent, State Department intimate of Dean Acheson, Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore, who as head of the inter-departmental Committee on Japan Policy, played his part in the conspiracy; who subsequently was appointed Ambassador to Switzerland but was relieved of his post in 1951 by Truman.

Laurence Duggan who was associated with Alger Hiss and Sumner Welles in the State Department and then became Director of the Rockefeller-subsidized propaganda agency, the Institute of International Education; who died, as have so many others associated in this conspiracy, in a highly suspicious plunge from the window of his sixteenth-floor office, after being questioned about his activities by the House Un-American Activities Committee; and who was a member of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations.

Agnes Smedley, author, who was accused of being a Soviet spy by General MacArthur's intelligence officers, denied the charges, but on her recent death in 1950, left her entire fortune to the Communist Party. Harry Dexter White, top adviser to

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who like Duggan, died mysteriously after being questioned by the House American Activities Committee.

The report of the Rockefeller Foundation for 1936 makes it clear that the role of the Institute of Pacific Relations is to serve as ringleader and master conspirator in Far Eastern activities for the large group of organizations, schools, colleges, universities and other institutions subsidized by it for the avowed purpose of creating a "new (internationalist) social order" and world-wide "managed economy" required, by the Marx-inspired "social sciences". It reports a Foundation grant of \$30,000 for the purpose of setting up an AMERICAN CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE, the function of which is to make the conspiracy and propaganda of the IPR a part and parcel of the activities of the balance of the agencies and lobbies maintained or supported by Rockefeller "philanthropy". The key agencies specified are the following:

- Council on Foreign Relations
 - Social Science Research Council
 - Foreign Policy Association
 - American Council of Learned Societies
 - American Council on Intellectual Cooperation
- These organizations all interlock membership and officers with the IPR and dominate the wide array of Rockefeller controlled, subsidized or influenced agencies that serve as "internationalist" fronts. Indeed it would be difficult to say which had the wider array of fronts, the Rockefeller or the Soviets. And the difficulty is further enhanced because so many of both have been Rockefeller subsidized and controlled. They all serve as IPR "transmission belts", and many overlap.
- The Institute of Pacific Relations propagandists have responded to exposure of the subversive character of the organization by protests alleging that they have cleaned house, eliminated the acknowledged subversives and changed their officers. Thus on March 23, 1951, the IPR released to the press a story that was published in the *New York Times* of that date about the election of new trustees. These included Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Sidney D. Gamble, president of the Princeton Teaching

Foundation; and J. E. Wallace Sterling, president of Leland Stanford University. Joseph E. Johnson was Alger Hiss's assistant and "alter ego" in the State Department.

This statement was obviously issued with tongues in cheek. For all of them are Rockefeller puppets and members of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations who they are indoctrinated by Owen Lattimore, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, T. A. Blison, William W. Lockwood and others of the AMERASIA crew, who still preach the Rockefeller-Soviet-Axis program, and dominate the IPR and the entire web of Rockefeller propaganda agencies by remote control from the master agency, the Council. Furthermore two of them, Owen Lattimore, dignified with the post of Director of the Johns Hopkins School of International Relations, and William W. Lockwood, dignified with the post of Assistant Director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,—in which posts they have unique opportunities to implant their subversions and treachery in youngsters who are in training for State Department and Government posts,—are still members of the Board of Trustees of the IPR, as can be seen in the list of trustees published in the March 1950 issue of NEWS OF THE IPR. There is no public record of either one of these former editors of the pro-Soviet espionage and propaganda agency, AMERASIA, and associates of self-confessed spies and traitors, ever having renounced their earlier associations and convictions. The moral of the story seems to be that if you are a good Rockefeller Red you need fear no harm; but eventually you will be made a top educator and be given opportunity to subvert rising generations, train them for betrayal and lure them on to self destruction as victims of their own treason and mercenary in Rockefeller Crusades.

ROCKEFELLER GRANTS TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial

Year	Category	Amount
1934	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000
1935	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000
1936	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000
1937	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000
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2049	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000
2050	Rockefeller Foundation	\$10,000

It is quite fitting that General George Catlett Marshall, Secretary of Defense, should be a member of the Board of Trustees of the subversive Institute of Pacific Relations even though he has not made the grade of the Empire's top policy-making organization, the Council on Foreign Relations. For without the support of its bosses Marshall would never have obtained his promotion; and without his blind execution of their treacherous orders, they could have fulfilled the Rockefeller-Soviet

Axis's agreement to deliver China to the Soviets. The story of Marshall's promotion is well told by Walter Trohan in the March, 1951, issue of the AMERICAN MERCURY magazine.

"After the war Perahing made Marshall his aide-de-camp while Perahing was Chief of Staff.

"Up to the early thirties Marshall's career was one of slow but steady progress . . . Perahing, a retired but influential old dog of war had promised to have him made a brigadier general. But here Marshall met his first failure.

"True to his promise, Perahing called upon Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, and asked that his protégé be made a general. MacArthur was ready to oblige, but insisted that the promotion go through regular channels. Perahing agreed, confident Marshall could clear the hurdles. Friendly examination of the Marshall record showed what his superiors regarded as insufficient time with troops. MacArthur proposed to remedy this by giving him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort Screven, Ga., one of the finest regiments in the Army.

"Marshall was moved up from lieutenant-colonel to colonel, but his way to a general's stars appeared to be blocked forever when the Inspector General reported that under one year of Marshall's command the Eighth Regiment had dropped from one of the best regiments in the Army to one of the worst. MacArthur regretfully informed Perahing that the report made promotion impossible. To this day Marshall is uneasy in the presence of MacArthur.

"In 1936, after MacArthur had been succeeded by General Marlin Craig, Perahing tried again. But this time, knowing that the Army would never make Marshall a general, Perahing went directly to the White House. He persuaded Roosevelt to promote Marshall; and three years later when Roosevelt was looking for an agreeable Chief of Staff, he chose Marshall over twenty senior major generals and fourteen senior brigadiers.

"Marshall is, therefore, a 'political general' . . ."

Marshall served as a piliat tool of the conspirators in engineering the betrayal of our country into involvement in World War II without a declaration of war by Congress, and in the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. He has acknowledged that he deliberately withheld from the commanders at Pearl Harbor intelligence that was available well in advance of Japan's plans to attack it, and that he had ordered them to alert only for sabotage. In other words, Marshall has confessed to sabotage of the defenses of the nation in time of war. Men have been executed as traitors for lesser offenses and derelictions. Twenty-five hundred men and a fleet were sacrificed in the Pearl Harbor deal. The role played by the crew of the Institute of Pacific Relations in this has yet to be revealed in its entirety.

Strange indeed was the tale that Marshall told Congress of not knowing where he was on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor, at a time when he knew that the nation was in grave danger. But this defection obviously suited the purposes of the conspirators.

In 1948, it is reported, he was more anxious to arm Russia than to equip our own troops. At Teheran he agreed to the sell-out to the Communists of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He agreed to giving Russia control of the country to the west of Berlin and marooning American forces in that city in a strategically untenable position, with their supply lines running through territory held by the Communists. This act runs counter to all dictates of intelligence, aside from considerations of elementary military tactics. It virtually has placed American troops in a position where they can be held as hostages by the Communists, a situation that can be created as readily by the Russians as was the Berlin Blockade, whenever they are ready to cut loose. No paid Russian agent or avowed traitor could have rendered greater aid to the Soviet forces.

At Yalta Marshall collaborated with Alger Hiss in delivering Asia to the Communists after Japan was about ready to surrender. Despite the refusal of the Soviets to aid our forces in the Pacific, Marshall's anxiety to "cooperate with the Russians" was so intense that he approved of giving to Russia every strategic point, including Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin. Following the close of the war, in Decem-

ber 1945, Marshall was sent to China by the agents of the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis in the State Department with instructions drawn up by John Carter Vincent and Dean Acheson, to compel the Chinese Nationalists to yield to the Communists, whom they had on the run and were defeating badly. In spite of the warning of Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, who was assigned to the Communist headquarters at Yenan, that the Chinese Communists were collaborating with the Kremlin and controlled by it, Marshall forced upon the Nationalists a truce, under the threat of withholding American aid. He compelled Chiang Kai-shek to cut his forces down to fifty divisions.

To get around Congress's refusal to accept the program for arming the Chinese Communist Army by "lend lease", proposed by Dean Acheson, Marshall served as recruiting agent for the Red Army and ordered the transfer of Nationalist troops to the Communist forces so that they could be paid and fed with funds appropriated by Congress for the support of the Nationalist Army. He also promoted "an agreement . . . under which American officers would be training and equipping rebel Chinese Communist units at the very time they were ambushing our marines and when Communists the world over were waging a war of nerves upon the United States . . ." (C.R. March 30, 1950, p. 4488).

Marshall dictated the prolongation of the Nationalist-Communist truce, that he had ordered, for a period of fourteen months, giving the Communists a chance to reorganize their Army with U.S. funds and supplies. Then Marshall compelled Chiang to allow a force of 500,000 Communists to move through the impregnable Kalgan Pass to approach Peking; and repeated the treachery to permit the approach of the Communist Armies to Hankow.

In the meantime, the Soviet agents in the State and Commerce Departments withheld delivery of military supplies and equipment assigned to the Nationalists. The dumping of the Army surplus intended for the Nationalists into the Indian Ocean at the order of Lauchlin Currie, assistant to President Roosevelt, member of Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations and the IPR, and named by Elizabeth Bentley as a feeder of Communist spy channels, who is now carrying on in the Republic of

Colombia (*N.Y. Times*, April 9, 1951) as an "adviser," has been mentioned. The supply to the Communists of essential war materiel has flowed continuously through such devices as "lend-lease", UNRRA, the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact and the Point IV program. The situation parallels the arming of the Germans and the Japs prior to World War II, by the same principals.

As a reward for delivering China to the Communists, that has proved so costly and disastrous for the U.S., Marshall was promoted to the post of Secretary of State; for he served the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis well. His first official act was to appoint his masters' agent, who had previously directed his treacherous mission to China, Dean Acheson, his chief of staff with "complete authority to cleanse the Department", presumably of non-Communists.

Marshall sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China to report on the situation in 1947. Wedemeyer courageously reported the truth and urged blocking the advance of Communism in China. This report was not to the satisfaction of Marshall and the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis. It was suppressed and Wedemeyer shelved.

The so-called "Marshall Plan" was written by Rockefeller Reds, promoted and propagandized by Rockefeller's Council on Foreign Relations and its subsidiary agencies, and actively pushed in Congress by the Rockefellerers personally. It was another tap on the U.S. Treasury and a device for looting the American people for the benefit of the Rockefeller Empire and its allies, on the pretense of aid to Europe, while at the same time leading the nation further on the road to bankruptcy and dictatorship. Marshall who was a mere pawn, as usual, knew little of its nature.

It is in connection with the Korean affair that Marshall has rendered the Rockefeller-Soviet Axis a most signal service that has brought the plottings and plans of the Institute of Pacific Relations to its most advanced state of fruition. The conviction of Alger Hiss, attacks on Acheson and other pro-Communists in the government and insistent demands for the reopening of the AMERASIA case and the consequences it involved, had created a very real "emergency" for the conspirators that threatened their entire program. Resentment also ran high

throughout the country at the delivery of China to the Reds by the State Department. Elections were in the offing. It was imperative that, in the words of John Foster Dulles, the American public be kept "artificially alarmed", if the scheme to attain dictatorship through looting by taxation, bankruptcy, defeat and confusion of the nation was to succeed,—and at the same time the deals with the Kremlin carried out. Korea served the purpose. Marshall furthered the scheme by advising Truman to send troops to Korea.

To promote their plot, Marshall was appointed Secretary of Defense. A more incongruous appointment could not be conceived; but so completely is the public duped that it met with little public protest or indignation. Marshall's first act was to rush to regiment the nation, under the cover of this emergency deliberately created for the purpose, into a military dictatorship, in the pattern of the Hopley plan. Anna Rosenberg, Rockefeller employed and subsidized "labor relations counselor" and agent, with a record of appointment to the NRA dictatorship plot by self-confessed Communist agent and CIO attorney, Lee Pressman, was appointed by Marshall to the great delight of all subversives and Communists, to head the new totalitarian drive. When her appointment came under attack Nelson Rockefeller offered to appear in person before the Senate committee considering the appointment, on behalf of his minion.

The Institute of Pacific Relations can boast with even more justification than can any of the units that comprise the vast spiderweb of Rockefeller-Soviet intrigue, even the Council on Foreign Relations, that the present and plight of our country is what it is, because "they planned it that way." For though the CFR planned and directed the intrigues and betrayals, the IPR executed them. It played a stellar role in making a success of Japan's rearmament and its attack on Pearl Harbor. At the cost of a quarter of million casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars to our country it insured to its masters control of Eurasia. And the fulfillment of Lenin's plans, they speeded up by infiltrating our Government and effected them through the agency of our State Department and the traitorous activities of their agents.

Wherever the Institute of Pacific Relations has

turned its activities in the Orient it has stirred up unrest and subversion, and has paved the way for Soviet intrigue. In Mongolia, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, India, Indo-China, Thailand, Pakistan, Tibet and Iran, the story has been monotonously the same. Owen Lattimore's Joint U.N.-IPR mission to Afghanistan likewise forbodes its betrayal to the Soviets as did his traffic with Tibet. The Institute paces the schedule of the Soviets in the Far East, adopted by the Asiatic Communism of May 1949, which is as follows:

1. Conquer China, Hainan and Formosa.
2. Infiltrate and conquer Indochina and Burma.
3. Infiltration and riots in India, Pakistan and Philippines.
4. Infiltration and riots in Japan with the eventual purpose of taking Japan out of the American sphere, for which the way was being prepared by Dulles' peace parley with Japan and the suggested withdrawal of American troops, and by MacArthur's dismissal.
5. Win over Afghanistan. Owen Lattimore, who has expressed himself as being entirely in sympathy with the Soviet plans for Afghanistan was nevertheless recommended to the United Nations by the State Department for a joint mission with the IPR for working out the program of Rockefeller's Point IV program in Afghanistan. Apparently the plan, as usual, is to make Afghanistan a richer plum for the Soviets.
6. Infiltration and riots in Iran with the objective of taking it over with its oil. To facilitate this, pro-Soviet Ministers were to be appointed.

Due to its sponsors' control of our Government and State Department, the IPR has been completely successful in fulfilling their agreements and delivering over to the Soviets, China and much of Asia.

The Institute of Pacific Relations and its allied web of Rockefeller subsidized organizations are merely agencies of a vast conspiracy. The agencies could not have continued to exist and to carry on their work without the subsidy of the Rockefellerers and their fake "philanthropies". In most cases they could not have come into existence without their financial support and cooperation. The Rockefellerers cannot plead ignorance of the traitorous activities of these organizations that they have so lavishly

supported. For it is spread all over the public records where anyone who has an iota of intelligence can not fail to recognize. Any plea of lack of control over the agencies they established and financed is obviously sham. There is nothing in their charter or in the law that bars them from stepping in and taking over them. The sham is further confirmed by the personal and active participation in those agencies by the Rockefeller themselves and the receipt of their sympathy with the subversive causes in question.

It is equally a sham to pretend to investigate and expose these traitorous organizations and their agents but to omit any mention of the principals and the financiers who make possible their existence and activities with financial, political and moral support; to imprison or execute traitors and spies who were propagandized, groomed and trained for their treason in the schools, colleges and universities; and to permit to roam at large as honored citizens the arch-conspirators and masterminds who subverted the educational system of the land and of the world, and used as pawns, the deluded fools and venal traitors spawned thereby; or to pillory and occasionally imprison gamblers and fixers in so-called sports for the manipulation of fixes that involve only the money of those who voluntarily choose to gamble while holding in high honor the criminal master conspirators who gamble in an atrociously fixed game with the lives and fortunes of other people and jeopardize the very existence of the the nation.

Unless these conspirators are rapidly and relentlessly exposed and apprehended and prosecuted to the full extent of the laws on treason, and their traitorous conspiracy scotched, this country is faced with extinction, and it and the world are doomed to untold centuries of serfdom.

AMERICAN COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
NATIONAL OFFICERS AND TRUSTEES
At the Annual Meeting of Members held on February 21, 1939.

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PERJURY

THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE

by ALLEN WEINSTEIN



ALFRED A. KNOPP NEW YORK 1978

Alger and Whittaker: The Forging of Covert 359

Ladd (but not Hoover) should give him one, but that he should not "disclose information on current cases" to Hiss, nor mention the name of Whittaker Chambers. "He [Hiss] was going to do the talking," Hoover told Clark that same day, "and we would do the listening."

Hiss appeared at FBI headquarters on March 25 for a long discussion with Ladd. He denied membership in any Communist or Communist-front organizations, and speculated as to the sources of such rumors about him. Byrnes had asked Hiss about his association with Lee Pressman. "Hiss stated that he told Mr. Byrnes," according to Ladd's report, "that he used to know Pressman very well but had had no contacts with him recently." Hiss acknowledged belonging "for a period of five or six months" in the early Thirties to the International Juridical Association, "which is characterized as a small group interested in labor law." He mentioned Chambers's old contact Isaac Don Levine, who had written an article in July 1945 for the *Reader's Digest* "claiming that at the Yalta Conference, Hiss had persuaded the late President Roosevelt to agree to the admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia to the United Nations [as independent voting members] at a meeting where Roosevelt, Hiss, and Stalin were present. Hiss said this was a fabrication because he had never met with Roosevelt and Stalin alone, and besides he does not speak the Russian language."⁸⁸

The next day a State Department security officer, Robert Bannerman, sent a comprehensive secret report to Donald Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, outlining the negative information, Chambers's and Bentley's, accumulated by the FBI against Hiss. In his new post as director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Bannerman pointed out, not only did Hiss have responsibility for initiating and coordinating policy "in the fields of international security and organization, and dependent area affairs," but, more important: "In his position, he has access to all top secret material that comes to the Office of Special Political Affairs for action, and participates in top secret discussions and negotiations with other offices and divisions of the Department and with representatives of other governments. He is also in constant contact with ranking officers of the Department, of the War and Navy Departments as well as other governmental agencies and departments, and of the American delegation to the United Nations Organization." In short, if the charges leveled against him were true, Hiss was an ideal Soviet "agent-in-place."⁸⁹

But were the charges true? However deeply involved in the Communist underground Hiss may have been during the 1930s when he knew Chambers, was he also a Soviet spy after the latter's defection? And, if so, what kind of agent? Was his primary function to steal documents, "mess up policy," provide information on departmental policy-making—or all three? The answer is not readily apparent, but certain aspects of the evidence remain intriguing.

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with FBI approval, Byrnes allowed Hiss to continue as director of the Department's Office of Special Political Affairs with responsibility for U.N. business. But Hiss complained to an associate at one point (a conversation recorded in the FBI files) that he "had been having trouble" getting the appointments of particular people through, "trouble [that] seemed to center around [State's] . . . Security Investigations Department."⁹⁰

Even after six months of thorough checking and the accumulation of additional adverse hearsay reports concerning Hiss, both the FBI's and State's security inquiries proved inconclusive, turning up little concrete evidence. Raymond Murphy visited Chambers a second time on August 28, but got no new material except an assertion that Hiss had been a leading underground Communist whose task "was never to make converts. His job was to mess up policy." Chambers continued to insist that Hiss's underground unit "was not a spy ring."⁹¹

Although Hoover had persuaded Byrnes to tell Hiss that the rumors of Communist ties came from unfriendly Congressmen, and although Hoover resisted taking personal responsibility for recommending Hiss's dismissal, he was apparently dismayed when Byrnes failed to act. Thus, when complaints from Congress did not persuade the Secretary to fire Hiss—and when Byrnes chose instead merely to insulate Hiss for further investigation within the Department—Hoover began a calculated campaign of leaks to his own supporters in Congress and the press. Walter Winchell, the FBI director's most intimate journalistic confidant, broadcast a clear reference to Hiss on September 29: "It can be categorically stated that the question of the loyalty and integrity of one high American official has been called to the attention of the President." Hoover kept up a steady flow of memos about Hiss throughout the year to Truman, Clark, and Byrnes. By late autumn Hiss had made arrangements to leave the Department for a position that might have attracted him under normal conditions.⁹²

"This afternoon Mr. Dulles asked me if I would be interested in succeeding Nicholas Miraculous Butler as President of the Carnegie Endowment at \$15,000 to \$17,000 a year!" Hiss had written Priscilla from the Queen Elizabeth on January 4, 1946, while en route to the U.N. meeting in London. "He [Dulles], of course, as a cautious New York lawyer said he was only one of the trustees and could only recommend me, etc. . . . I am not, of course, seriously tempted but it indicates we can still, as of today's prices even, earn a living in some lines of work." Among those recommending Hiss to Dulles for the post were several reporters on board ship to whom Dulles had mentioned the opening, including Bert Andrews, chief of the *New York Herald Tribune's* Washington bureau, and James Reston of *The New York Times*. Although Hiss dismissed Dulles's inquiry flippantly in this January 1946 letter, he developed more interest in the post as the year progressed.⁹³

Dulles had checked with Byrnes prior to the FBI probe, and the Secre-

"various public offices." Moreover, according to Davis, he had not received reports prior to the summer of 1948 that Hiss was a Communist.⁹⁴

Testifying to Hiss's pro-British sentiments at the time of the Nazi-Soviet pact (when Communists opposed American aid to England), Stanley K. Hornbeck related his knowledge of his former assistant. Hornbeck also said Hiss had favored aiding only the Nationalist government in China and not the Communist insurgents during the war, a dubious argument since the Soviet government took much the same position at the time. Hornbeck recalled Hiss making handwritten notes to summarize documents for him, the practice Hiss said had been followed with Sayre as well.⁹⁵


But Hornbeck agreed that Hiss had "summarized" only lengthy cables, not brief two-line documents such as the Mary Martin telegram. Moreover, he could not recall Hiss composing handwritten summaries of documents when he (Hornbeck) was away from Washington. Murphy's main concern was whether Hornbeck had heard "reports concerning the loyalty of the defendant." Neither the prosecutor nor the witness mentioned William C. Bullitt's name, although obviously both were familiar with his evidence, and Hornbeck replied: "A close personal friend of mine came to see me on one occasion and said he had heard . . . that Mr. Hiss was a fellow traveler."

Others who avowed a knowledge of Alger Hiss's exemplary reputation included retired Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, who had worked with Hiss at Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco U.N. Conference; Calvert Magruder, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Boston), who had taught Hiss at Harvard Law and become friendly with him later in Washington; Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., a friend since Harvard days; corporation lawyer Gerard Swope, Jr., who had worked with Hiss at the New York firm of Wright, Gordon in 1932-3; Philip C. Jessup, Carnegie Endowment trustee and State Department "Ambassador at Large," who had known Hiss and served with him both at State and at the Endowment; Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, who knew Hiss first in AAA's Legal Division and a decade later when Stevenson attended the San Francisco U.N. meeting; and former Solicitor General Charles Fahy, a Washington friend.⁹⁶

The prosecutor could do nothing to counter the effect of this procession of eminent defense witnesses except to bring out in cross-examination that all of them—Hornbeck excepted—knew little about the events that had led to Hiss's indictment for perjury. But Murphy did subpoena as a rebuttal witness John Foster Dulles, whose testimony did not enhance Hiss's reputation for "integrity, loyalty and veracity."

⁸⁸ Dean Acheson told a conflicting story to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in January 1949, saying there that "Mr. John Davis spoke to me about the matter in the early part of 1947 and I told him . . . that there had been these rumors about [Hiss] . . . and that I did not take any stock in these rumors." But Murphy knew nothing about this executive-session testimony. Dean Acheson, Executive Session Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), January 14, 1949.

HISS: THE STATE DEPARTMENT YEARS



Hiss, sitting behind Secretary Stettinius and President Roosevelt, attended the February 1945 Yalta Conference as an important American staff assistant. Other statesmen seated around the table include Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, Eden, and Gromyko. Gromyko would later recommend Hiss to Stettinius for the post of Temporary Secretary General of the United Nations.



Hiss, chief organizer of the U.N.'s founding conference at San Francisco in April 1945, shakes hands with President Truman after the latter's speech to the delegates. At right is Stettinius and behind them is Major General Harry Vaughan.

obtained samples of her typing from another Woodstock, and the Hiss attorneys did not know that the Bureau's experts had been more cautious on this point, if only because they lacked comparable recent samples.

Instead Alger Hiss's lawyers argued that the Hisses had given their Woodstock to the Catletts in December 1937, before the documents were typed between January and April 1938. But the Catletts, when talking candidly with McLean and other defense lawyers, said that they had most likely received the typewriter after April 1938. Moreover, unknown to the defense lawyers, Mike Catlett and Donald Hiss had located the Woodstock at Ira Lockey's home by February 1949, two months before Edward McLean, in an independent search, tracked the machine down, no thanks to Catlett or Alger's brother.

Defense lawyers, therefore, tried to explain away the "immutable witnesses" in several ways. One argument ran: Hiss's attorneys, not Chambers, had submitted the handwritten and typed material to the Justice Department in November 1948 and had retrieved the Woodstock after a long search, hardly the acts (the defense attorneys avowed) of a guilty person. Chambers's possession of the documents, therefore, had an explanation different from the obvious one: Either he managed somehow to obtain Woodstock N330099 after the Hisses had disposed of it; or he had somehow used the machine even while it remained in Hiss's home but without the latter's knowledge; or he received the State Department records from his other source at the Department—Julian Wadleigh, aided by some still-unknown "Mr. X" in the Far Eastern Division.

Although various possible conspiratorial explanations for the documents were broached during 1948-9, most came directly from Alger Hiss and were either rejected by his lawyers or disproved by the facts. Thus in December 1948 Henry Collins sent Tabitha Petran to McLean with the suggestion that the documents might have come from "German sources," specifically the files of a Baron von Weizsacker. "She implied," wrote McLean on December 30, "that her informant was a German spy." (Petran had been one of Maus Daring's associates at Time, mentioned several times in Darling's letters to Cowley, in the abortive 1943 effort to attack Chambers.) Hiss, aided by Telford Taylor, a friend from AAA days and a prosecutor at the Nuremberg war-crimes trials, put John F. Davis on the Weizsacker lead. (The following 1949 letters in the Defense Files describe the process: Hiss to Davis, January 19 and January 27; Davis to Hiss, January 25 and February 25; Davis to Taylor, January 24.)

In late 1948 Hiss suggested a second alternative explanation for the documents: "Hiss told me some time ago," McLean wrote on January 17, 1949, "that he was at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 when the American scandal broke and that Stettinius told him that he had seen some of the papers taken from [Philip] Jaffe [who then edited the magazine American, in whose offices scores of classified government documents were seized] and that they included papers from Stettinius's office and from Hiss's office. I have asked Hiss to find out all he can about this and I have asked John Davis to try and find out from the House Committee whether it has any record of the documents which were involved." McLean interviewed Jaffe and others involved in the affair, while Davis probed in Washington. Both men satisfied themselves that Chambers's documents could not have come from the batch seized at Amerasia (which would have assumed government complicity in a plot against Hiss), and Davis's inquiries into the Baron von Weizsacker possibility proved similarly fruitless.

Thus Hiss had failed to show that the documents had come from tainted

with Morris during the preparation of the book," Chester Lens wrote in October 1952.

In 1953 the Earl Jowitt published *The Strange Case of Alger Hiss*. Jowitt, formerly Lord Chancellor and Attorney General of Great Britain, reviewed numerous questions about the fairness of Hiss's trial and about unexplained aspects of the evidence. Before Doubleday published the book in the United States, it requested a number of excisions and changes in the text of the original English edition to ensure greater accuracy, after receiving complaints from friends or supporters of Whittaker Chambers concerning Jowitt's bias and his research. Rebecca West had pointed out thirty misquotations from Chambers's *Witness* and perhaps as many as one hundred factual errors in Jowitt's original edition. Jowitt, like Alistair Cooke in *A Generation on Trial*, had criticized many aspects of the American legal system, including the freedom allowed the press in reporting trials, the prosecution's domination of Grand Jury actions, and the functioning of trial juries. But at the heart of Jowitt's analysis were the same doubts Hiss and his lawyers had worked to keep alive in their appeal and in Lane's motion for a new trial. The English jurist inferred strongly that the FBI sought to obtain from Chambers perjured testimony (and perhaps faked documents) in order to frame Hiss.

Despite Jowitt's assertion of "absolute impartiality," there is evidence that he received help in his project from Hiss's lawyers and shared their views. Defense researcher Elinor Ferry wrote Helen Ryttenwieser from London on October 8, 1952: "Yesterday, Lord Jowitt invited me to lunch at Middle Temple. . . . From the record of the second trial, he has concluded that on the evidence, AH should not have been convicted. Moreover, he believes AH to be innocent and asked some quite penetrating questions. . . . P.S. Jowitt was extremely happy to have the House hearings—And sends his thanks."

Like Jowitt, subsequent writers such as William Reuben, Dr. Meyer Zelig, Fred J. Cook, and John Chabot Smith received cooperation from Alger Hiss and his lawyers while developing their own conspiracy theories which, in all cases, built upon arguments first made by Hiss and his attorneys between 1948 and 1952. There have been few original theories of conspiracy since then—mainly, instead, extensive elaborations of the durable older models using newer bits of "evidence."

Hiss himself has rarely shied away, either in his own volume on the case or subsequently, from suggesting the plausibility of several competing theories at once. Thus, at a May 1, 1959, meeting with historian C. Vann Woodward and others, Hiss again presented the "forgery by typewriter" argument, pointing the finger at "not more than three people" who devised the plot, particularly Chambers and Isaac Don Levine. Although Hiss specifically excluded the FBI from complicity in the scheme, he asserted (according to Woodward's notes of the meeting) that they knew of the phony Woodstock and, also, "suborned every witness in this case." Elsewhere, during the 1950s and more often in recent years, Hiss has assigned the Bureau a more active role, either in helping to build a fake machine or in substituting one with Ira Lockey in time for the defense to "find" it.

Woodward's notes contain an intriguing passage in which Hiss described his notion of confronting Chambers at Westminster that year, something he said his lawyers had dissuaded him from doing: "I planned to go out to his farm and walk in on him and simply say . . . Why did you do it? Not that I expected

on the Roles of Horace W. Schmahl, Adam Kunze and William J. Donovan in the Hiss Case." Briefly—since the plot is intricate and the conspirators many—Irons speculated that Schmahl and perhaps others had been hired by General William Donovan, former head of the OSS, between the end of World War II and the August 1948 HUAC hearings to build the phony Woodstock for later use against Hiss. The documents used in the scheme, Irons theorized, might have come from the *Amerasia* papers (a return to an older theory), and the general purpose of the plot—in which purported "China Lobby" and other right-wing elements figured—was to stir anti-Communist sentiment by destroying the career of Hiss, who supposedly had been identified in the public mind as a symbol of both New Deal social reform and a policy of Soviet-American friendship culminating in the Yalta "sell-out."

Robert Sherrill's 1976 review picked up on some but not all of Irons's cast of possible conspirators: Schmahl, Donovan, Adam Kunze (an allegedly pro-Nazi typewriter-store owner), Isaac Don Levine, HUAC staff member Ben Mandel, several "reactionary" security officers at State, and various China Lobby and other right-wing anti-Communists—all of whom were potential actors in the plot to frame Alger Hiss. Sherrill carried Irons's "tentative . . . hypotheses" even further, implicating in the scheme Chambers, Nixon, Hoover, Henry Luce, the FBI, HUAC, *Time*, and the Communist Party. The absence of any evidence has encouraged, rather than restrained, the "conspiracy fever" of both writers. Neither Irons nor Sherrill has produced a comprehensive study of the Hiss case. Irons's views have been made known largely through writings deposited in the Hiss defense files, in a brief law-journal paper on the FBI files, and in the letters columns of several magazines. In the November 1976 issue of *Law Library Journal* Irons retreated a bit from his conspiracy theory, at least in this erroneous but suggestive passage:

The FBI and State Department files also demonstrate conclusively that the impetus for the charges against Hiss, and for Chambers' August 1948 appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee, came from the leaders of the China Lobby. In fact, the leading forces behind Chambers' testimony were China Lobby leaders on the staffs of the Un-American Activities Committee and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, both [sic] of whom were close associates of both Congressman Nixon and informants of the FBI. This historical evidence does not, of course, bear on Hiss' guilt or innocence, but it does illuminate the genesis of the campaign against Hiss, which was based on his role at Yalta and in formulating Far Eastern policy in the State Department during the war, a policy perceived as a sell-out by the China Lobby.

Irons was wrong about the "genesis" of the HUAC hearings (see Chapters I and X). Also, several times in 1948-9 Hiss described himself as a strong supporter of the Nationalist Chinese government while serving as Hornbeck's advisor during the war, and he disassociated himself from any connection with those advisors inside China who urged a coalition government including the Communists. Under the circumstances, he made a curious target for General Donovan and the many others whom Irons persists in terming "China Lobby leaders."

4. CHAMBERS AS PARAMOUR: THE REVENGE MOTIVE

"Was there any evidence of homosexuality involving Chambers?" Alger Hiss was asked at the 1959 gathering recorded by C. Vann Woodward's notes. "Very definitely yes," he replied. "In fact my lawyers had witnesses who were fully

Handwritten notes:
11, 12, 24, 28, 32
37, 57, 67, 73, 100,
106, 201, 202, 206
360, 364, 484, 570,
411, 156, 141, 112
156, 202, 207-9,
278, 381
Sherrill's biography of
The American-Russian
Intifada
under the 571
then deleted to have
American part 34 pages.

Handwritten notes:
American - Russian christians
in histories around 1946
may have become
+ 16 years Int Organizations
Rus Agency for that Comp. +
Development 10
Looking up in C. V. Publ
L-612

Handwritten notes:
John D. Rockefeller was born in
1837. He was an extremely wealthy
man at age 40. By 1910 he was
the wealthiest man in the world.
His motto "COMPETITION IS SIN"



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THE LATTIMORE STORY

The full story
of the most incredible
conspiracy of our time

Reds in our government could do without an army. When that Russian line was adopted, the American IPR propagandists went along with it and abandoned it when it changed again.

It is merely necessary to add that, as fast as these books appeared—written by IPR members or associates—they were given immediate and high acclaim in leading journals in reviews written by other IPR staff members. When, for instance, IPR member Agnes Smedley wrote a book, IPR member Mark Gayn hailed it as an earthy, honest, powerful book by an honest woman. When IPR member Lawrence K. Rosinger wrote a book, it was reviewed glowingly by Agnes Smedley and this same Mark Gayn. And when IPR member Rosinger wrote another book, it was given a boost by IPR editor, writer and trustee Owen Lattimore, and when Lattimore turned out a book, it got a lively plug from IPR editor Maxwell Stewart as a reviewer, who also recommended highly in another review a very bad book by one of the worst of the Communist spies—IPR member Guenther Stein. Lattimore also gave this a generous boost for good measure. Thus the IPR members turned out this mass of pro-Communist books, and these books were in turn highly recommended to the public by other IPR members in literary journals. The gravity of this enterprise in mind control cannot be overestimated. At this time, editors, editorial writers, publicists, teachers, political commentators were rushing to the new books for the facts about this Asiatic world into which we had been suddenly plunged. And it was to these books, as well as to articles in various top American

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magazines—many written by these same IPR staff writers and their companions—that American editors and writers turned for professional information about China and Asia generally.

The whole episode reveals the possibilities of propaganda and thought control of a high order. The operators were expert and organized and had mastered the strategy of inserting their poison into some central and unsuspected pool of information. The lies and half-truths in these books and in a few professional magazines began to color the news and the opinions in the American press and in pulpits, classrooms and political organizations all over the country. And the central agency which carried on this extraordinary experiment of mass poisoning was the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It is a startling fact that the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Internal Security was able to list 48 men and women associated with the IPR in one way or another as staff workers or writers or officers who were identified in testimony before the committee under oath as Communist Party members. They were (Report, pp. 148-149):

Solomon Adler*	Chen Han-seng
James S. Allen	Ch'ao-ting Chi (Hansu Chan)
Asiaticus	Harriet Levine Chi
Hilda Austern	Frank V. Coe*
Kathleen Barnes	Len DeCaux
Joseph F. Barnes*	Israel Epstein*
T. A. Bisson	John K. Fairbank
Evans F. Carlson	Frederick V. Field*
Abraham Chapman	Julian R. Friedman

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Talitha Corbush
Alger Hiss*
Philip Jaffe
Anthony Jankinson
Corliss Lamont
Olga Lang
Owen Lattimore*
William M. Mandel
Kate Mitchell
E. Herbert Norman
Harriet L. Moore
Hozumi Ozaki*
Mildred Price
Lee Pressman*

Lawrence K. Rosinger
Andrew Roth
Helen Schneider
Agnes Smedley*
Nym Wales
Andrew Staiger
Ilona R. Soes
Maxwell S. Stewart
Anna Louise Strong*
Daniel Thorne
Mary Van Kleeck
Ella Winter
Kumar Goshal
John Carter Vincent

While none of these (Austin, Joseph Barnes, Fairbank, Friedman, Lamont, Owen Lattimore, Mitchell, Stewart and Vincent) denied Communist Party connections, there is little doubt they were all apologists for the Communist cause in China. In addition, the following with IPR connections (as well as those starred* above) were named as having collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus: Lanchin Curtis, Laurence Duggan, Michael Greenberg, Fred Poland, Guenther Stein, Harry Dexter White, Victor A. Yakhontoff (Report, pp. 148-149).

The list includes IPR executive committee members, executive secretaries, editors of IPR journals and pamphlets and books, research workers and writers. Will any intelligent man, interested in the truth, in the presence of these facts refuse to recognize the power of such an organization for mischief in the critical years

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in which it functioned? Will he close his eyes to the significance of this collection of operators, who ran the show and directed its propaganda, and permit himself to be blinded by the list of eminent businessmen and educators whose names furnished the protective screen on the letterheads behind which these others worked?

Before we get down to details on Owen Lattimore, it is necessary that the reader have a clear picture of the powerful and ingenious apparatus with which he worked and of which he was one of the moving spirits and most influential operators. This brings us to an appraisal of some of the enterprises operated or sponsored by the IPR. Most revealing is the case of *Amerasia*, a magazine launched in 1937.

CHAPTER O

In February 1945 the security officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) read a copy of *Amerasia*. One article contained a paragraph taken verbatim from a secret OSS document. A visit to the offices of *Amerasia* revealed that this magazine was directed by Philip Jaffe and Frederick V. Field, both IPR officials and both of whom were known to the agents as Communists. The case was turned over to Frank Bielaski, OSS Director of Investigations. Bielaski visited the *Amerasia* offices after midnight—admitted by the building superintendent. To his amazement he found stacks of government documents, most of them

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marked "secret" and "top secret." He found the desks of Jaffe, the editor, and of Kate Mitchell, his assistant, littered with secret documents from Army and Naval Intelligence, the OSS and the State Department. Bielaski was impressed particularly by one document marked "top secret." It dealt with something called "A-bomb." He supposed it referred to some new piece of ordinance. Yet here was a secret document dealing with the atomic bomb, still unexploded—the most highly guarded secret of the war—lying in the offices of a group of Communists connected with the IPR.*

Bielaski reported these disturbing discoveries to General William Donovan, chief of OSS. The officers felt they had walked into a "large going wholesale business in secret government documents." *Amerasia* had a small circulation—about 2,000 at the time—yet it had large offices provided with every mechanism for reproducing documents. The case was promptly reported to the State Department and the FBI, which put 75 operatives on the trail of *Amerasia* and kept them there for two months. They found a steady flow of documents from the State Department to *Amerasia* and back. The documents originated in Army and Naval Intelligence and the OSS, but they were routed to *Amerasia* through State.

D. Milton Ladd, Assistant Director of the FBI, said some of these documents contained such closely guarded secrets as to cause the greatest alarm.† One of them

*State Dept. Loyalty Investigation by Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1950, pp. 625-627.

†Ibid., pp. 1028-1074.

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revealed one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war. After two months' preparation, the FBI arrested Philip Jaffe, editor, Kate Louise Mitchell, assistant editor, John Stewart Service, a State Department research officer, Andrew Roth, a lieutenant in Naval Intelligence, Emanuel Larsen, a State Department employee, and Mark Gayn, a left-wing journalist. Roth had been a research worker for *Amerasia* before he went to Naval Intelligence. Although he was reported to be a Communist, Naval Intelligence ruled this could not be held against him, and he was assigned as liaison officer between Naval Intelligence and the State Department, where he could do the most harm. The entire story was given to a grand jury which indicted Jaffe, Larsen and Roth. Service, Mitchell and Gayn were not indicted.

The chief relevance of all this to our present narrative is that all those involved were connected with the IPR. In fact, *Amerasia* was planned and launched by the IPR. In 1937, Frederick V. Field, Communist and secretary of the IPR, discussed the subject with his associates on the executive committee. He has testified that he told them "one of the best ways to ensure that the Institute remain in the research field and avoid becoming political was to establish an organization where it could blow off steam outside the organization" (p. 115). That is, the Institute could remain in appearance a research organization but could use a separate organization to employ that research for propaganda purposes. This proposal, he testified, carried great weight with his IPR associates. They established *Amerasia* as a separate corporate organization, but set up shop on the same

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floor with the American Council of IPR—in fact in adjoining offices with communicating doors. Field said it had the blessing of the IPR managers. In fact, it was an IPR satellite.

Amerasia was financed by Field and Jaffe. Field owned 50 per cent of the stock and Jaffe 49 per cent. Field, executive secretary of the IPR, was chairman of the board of *Amerasia* and Jaffe was editor. Others connected with *Amerasia* on its board were T. A. Bisson, Benjamin Kizer, Kate Louise Mitchell, Harriet L. Moore—all pro-Communists and all active in IPR. It included Owen Lattimore and that insouciant secretary of IPR, William W. Lockwood, who testified under oath that he never knew any Communists in the IPR. *Amerasia*, as a periodical journal, became, as anyone may see clearly from its contents, an out-and-out Communist organ.

The most extraordinary feature of this strange case was the trial and disposition of the charges. Mark Gayn, John Stewart Service and Kate Louise Mitchell were not indicted. Roth was indicted but never tried and the charge against him was dropped. Jaffe and Larsen were indicted, but the indictments were dismissed and an ordinary charge of simple larceny was substituted. Gayn said he got the material from Jaffe in typewritten form—he saw no government documents—despite the testimony of an FBI agent that he found Gayn's fingerprints on original documents. Service had been detected by the FBI visiting Jaffe's hotel room and turning over documents to Jaffe which Service warned him were secret. Service admitted he had made copies of his own

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secret documents and given them to Jaffe. Miss Mitchell was not indicted, although 18 envelopes of secret documents were found on her desk. On one occasion the FBI trailed Miss Mitchell and Jaffe to the home of a Mrs. Blumenthal in the Bronx. Jaffe went in alone and returned with a large envelope. The car then returned to the *Amerasia* offices, where Miss Mitchell got out with the envelope. Mrs. Blumenthal testified she had made typed copies of the original government secret documents for Jaffe. Despite all this, no action was taken against Gayn, Mitchell and Service. Most astonishing, Service was reinstated in his State Department job. It was not until five years later that his dismissal was forced on the State Department by the Loyalty Board when it declared him a poor security risk.

The charge of larceny against Jaffe and Larsen was tried on a quiet Saturday morning. The government prosecutor explained to the court this was merely a case of excessive professional zeal. The defendants were journalists, the judge was told, a bit too industrious in their profession, and passing out secret documents to journalists was a common practice—which was a falsehood. The statement was made that the documents were unimportant. This was in 1945, when the honeymoon with Russia was over. The prosecutor insisted he did not know Jaffe was a Communist, yet the FBI had trailed him to a conference in Earl Browder's office. Jaffe was fined \$2500 and Larsen \$500, which Jaffe paid.

What was not made clear at the time was that *Amerasia* was a propaganda arm of the American

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Council of IPR. The arrests had produced a state of consternation in the IPR offices. But, despite the fact that the personnel were all IPR officers or agents and that they occupied adjoining and communicating offices, the connection was never revealed by the government.

CHAPTER

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||| We have already noted the character of Frederick V. Field, the Communist described by Dr. Jessup as the man "who gave leadership to the American Council." We must now turn to two other men who, with Field, made up the brains and energy of the IPR. These were Dr. Edward C. Carter and Owen Lattimore. There is plenty of evidence to show that Carter was much under the influence of Lattimore. Lattimore was the master intriguer—Carter the impressive manager. And the shadows of these two men are found over many of the enterprises of the pro-Red groups in America.

There was a batch of other organizations especially devoted to the interests of Russia and the Russian people. One of these was Russian War Relief, Inc. The pro-Communist Harriet L. Moore, who had served as an interim secretary of the American Council of the IPR, was secretary of Russian War Relief. The International Workers Order was also a Communist front. It held a mass meeting in Carnegie Hall in July 1944, and among

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the speakers were Earl Browder and Dr. Edward C. Carter.

The American-Russian Institute was another such pro-Communist front. On this board were the IPR staff members Maxwell S. Stewart and Harriet L. Moore—and Dr. Edward C. Carter. His wife was a sponsor of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, headed by the well-known Communist apologist Corliss Lamont (also an IPR member) as chairman, and Arthur Upham Pope, another Communist apologist, as vice-chairman. There was another unit organized by the American League for Peace and Democracy—a notorious Communist front—called the China Aid Council. Mrs. Edward C. Carter was its chairman. Dr. Carter was a contributor to the magazine *Soviet Russia Today* and wrote in that journal a defense of the infamous Communist purge trials of the 'thirties.

When confronted by critics of the IPR, Dr. Carter always referred to the eminent conservatives like Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur and others who adorned its board. But these men did not operate the Institute nor write its propaganda. They were just the fringe on top. If this country needs anything, it is some sort of ideological *Bradstreet* to which corporation executives and bank presidents and college presidents can go for reports on the precise character of the councils, leagues, institutes and foundations to which they are asked to lend the weight of their names and the support of their check-books.

Carter understood thoroughly what he was doing. He was asked by the McCarran Committee: "Did you not

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any individual it is not always easy to put him into his proper compartment. All indulged in praise of the same heroes and denunciation of the same enemies, so that it is not always a simple matter to put the right label on any given individual—whether he be a Party member, an espionage agent, an ideological ally or just a plain fuzzy-minded dupe. All are equally dangerous.

As for Lattimore, one thing is now certain, and that is, whenever Far Eastern affairs have called for critical decisions, the shadow of Lattimore has fallen across some agency of opinion and decision on the side of the Asiatic Communist objectives. He has been the subject of two investigations—the Tydings Committee investigation, which exonerated him, and the McCarran Committee investigation, which unanimously denounced him as a liar.

Which was the dominant figure in this costly partnership of Carter and Lattimore is a matter of conjecture. Carter—large, venerable, suave—is clearly the better front man. Lattimore is the more devious, fertile in contriving stratagems. Carter is the imposing visible leader; Lattimore the cagey schemer, pursuing his schemes with infinite persistence. The Senate committee pointed out that he seemed to have a special fondness for the word "cagey."

In 1938, the Rockefeller Foundation made a grant to the IPR of \$90,000 for a Far East study project. Carter named on the group three Communists—Chen Han-seng, Chi'ao-ting Chi and a third—a German-named Hans Muller but known as Asiaticus. Han-seng and Chi'ao-ting Chi are now in Red China. Chi was a former

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associate of Lattimore at the Walter Hines Page School in Baltimore. The study for which these three were named by Carter was supposed to be an impartial inquiry under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Lattimore wrote to Carter: "I think you were pretty cagey to turn over so much of the China section to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do so with the right touch" (italics added). Lattimore meant they would bring out the Red angle, but would do it slyly and effectively, without revealing the Red tinge. And he was expressing his admiration of Carter for Carter's "cageyness." Carter was forced to admit on the witness stand that Lattimore was asking him to stress the Communist line. In this same letter, Lattimore used an even more striking sentence. He suggested to Carter that "the good scoring position differed with different countries" and added, "My hunch is that it would pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position." Little did Lattimore dream that Carter's old barn would open its wooden jaws and emit these damning letters. Lattimore wrote further that he wanted the British Liberals scored—why is not made clear—but "as for the USSR—back up their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anyone else the impression of subservience" (pp. 39-41; italics added).

Despite his accustomed cageyness, Lattimore could be somewhat headlong at times. The naturally cagey Carter had to curb him. In 1939, Lattimore wrote a correspondent in Australia: "I am making a general

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more actually sent it to Moscow for approval. Moscow was slow with its reply, so Lattimore published it. But he wrote an explanation to Motylev that he just had to publish some such articles, otherwise the IPR will be called "an organ of Soviet propaganda." Then he added this incredibly revealing sentence: "Whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article we must make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true value of the same situation." And he ends by admitting that *Pacific Affairs* ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. The Hubbard article had been printed, but with footnotes explaining away the more objectionable statements, while a reply was printed in the same issue and Harriet Moore was asked by the IPR to write with Andrew Gradjanzev "the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can be produced" (pp. 3435-3454).

In 1938, the Soviet brought out a *World Atlas*, hailed as an important contribution to Communist propaganda. Documents found in the IPR files indicated that its aim was to give a "Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world"—to present the contrast between the capitalist and the Communist world. It was compiled under the direction of Motylev, director of the Communist Academy and head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow. For some reason there was tremendous excitement about this *Atlas*. A memo in the IPR files signed by Carter read: "This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet *World Atlas* has arrived. . . . Two

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precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one to me" (p. 2708).

Lattimore reviewed it in *Pacific Affairs*. He wrote:

→ The historical message in short of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arriving at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (p. 2708; italics added).

The year 1945 was the critical one for Soviet plans in the Far East. It was clear that Germany was approaching defeat, and when this occurred the full weight of American naval and military power would be brought to bear upon the Pacific and the days of Japanese resistance would be numbered. The moment was approaching when the victors would have to agree upon the terms of surrender and on the disposition of the fruits of victory. Before this, Stalin had a commitment from Roosevelt to arm with American munitions a huge force of Russian soldiers in time to participate in the final subjugation of Japan. The invasion by Russia of Manchuria and Northern Korea was agreed on, as we have seen. The great provinces of Northern China—Manchuria, Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia—were within Russia's grasp. The first stage of the delivery of China to the Communists was at hand—namely, the drive to force Chiang Kai-shek to unite with the Chinese Communists. As for Japan, Stalin hoped to persuade the

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other Soviet officials in Moscow (p. 3313). The purpose of this, of course, could only be to let the Red leaders know what Lattimore was doing to promote the Red line in America and facilitate his proposed trip to Moscow. He could not possibly be trying to sell the Russians their own line. However, the trip did not materialize.

CHAPTER

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||| About the same time a dramatic piece of information reached the American State Department. In March or April, Colonel Dana Johnson, Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, after interviewing numerous Japanese prisoners, reported to the State Department that Japan was ready to surrender, but that talk about liquidating the Emperor hindered capitulation. Then, on April 17, the Japanese government fell and Admiral Suzuki, chamberlain to the Emperor, became premier. He was a moderate, and Johnson reported he took this as a clear sign the Japanese were ready to quit. Moreover, the Department had intercepted messages between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow indicating the Japanese were eager to surrender if the Emperor was not molested (pp. 727-728).

At this time the State Department became an instrument of great importance. Edward Stettinius was Secretary of State, but was giving little attention to the office. Joseph Grew, Under Secretary, was functioning

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as Acting Secretary of State. Eugene Dooman was head of the Far Eastern Division, which had immediate concern with China and Japan. Both were top experts in Far Eastern affairs, and of unquestioned loyalty. But there was a wide cleavage in the Department. Dean Acheson was First Assistant Secretary under Grew. Alger Hiss, a Communist spy, was chief of the Department of Political Affairs, and an IPR member. John Carter Vincent, also of the IPR, was head of the China Division. He has recently been suspended by the Loyalty Review Board as a security risk.* Acheson headed this faction, which was restive under the leadership of Grew. John Carter Vincent had as his economic adviser in the China Division a pro-Communist named Julian Friedman, also connected with the IPR. Vincent began circulating a petition in the Department to bring Owen Lattimore, also of the IPR, into the Department as an adviser. This bold movement, tinged with impudence, came to the notice of Eugene Dooman, who notified Grew. Grew ordered the circulation of the petition stopped. But this did not check the insurgents, who put great faith in the master-minding of Lattimore. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, then president of Johns Hopkins and Lattimore's superior at that university, called on President Truman to intervene in Lattimore's favor (p. 707).

Lattimore and his confederates were playing for high stakes. The Japanese surrender was imminent. The IPR crowd knew that. It was the strategic hour for dictating the surrender terms—namely, the liquidation of the Emperor and the imposition of a savage peace upon Japan

* See footnote, p. 105.

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for Russia to enter the war in the Far East was approaching. The collapse of Japan was imminent. Stalin knew this because the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had approached Stalin on the subject of acting as an intermediary. *Stalin never divulged this to our government.*

The President and Secretary Byrnes returned from Potsdam August 7. The day before they arrived home the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. On August 9, Russia declared war on defeated Japan and marched 25 miles into Manchuria. Next day she penetrated 100 miles more. On the same day the Swiss legation received a notice from the Japanese government that Japan wished to surrender, "with the understanding that the declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler." Admiral Leahy urged acceptance. Byrnes insisted on unconditional surrender for its moral effect, but ended with the declaration that "the form of government of Japan will be established by the freely expressed will of the people"; this was what the Japanese wanted and they surrendered. Thus the first of the demands promoted by the IPR clique in Washington was frustrated. Their program called for liquidation of the Emperor and impoverishment of Japan. The fortunate intervention of Leahy and Byrnes at this critical moment defeated their plans. But there remained their objectives in China, and on this front the pro-Soviet clique in the IPR and the State Department had a signal and appalling success

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over a period of 13 critical years have been identified as Communists—Barnes, Field and Harriet Moore. And one other secretary resigned, because he became suspicious of the staff. The two official journals of the IPR—*Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*—were vigilant promoters of Communist objectives in China. Lattimore was editor of *Pacific Affairs* and was succeeded by Michael Greenberg, a Communist agent who later became an assistant to a Presidential secretary. I have already given a list of 48 persons identified with the work of the IPR, all of whom were either Communist Party members or actively engaged in defending the Communist aims in China. However, the McCarran Committee has made a voluminous study of the IPR and has compiled a list of 80 men and women with Communist affiliations who have functioned in connection with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Of these, 48 have been identified by witnesses under oath as Communists. Fourteen of these persons, given an opportunity to testify in their own behalf, have refused under oath to deny they were Communists. Six of the list are dead, but they are persons about whose Red connections there can be no question. Nineteen on the list are out of the country and hence could not be questioned, but all of them are persons whose Communist affiliations have been notorious. A full list of all these persons, with the data indicating their Communist affiliations, will be found beginning on page 144 of the elaborate Report on the IPR issued by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate Judiciary Committee (July 2, 1952).

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such as had already rendered Germany impotent. All else failing, on June 10, 1945, Lattimore took the desperate course of appealing directly to the President. He wrote Truman asking for a personal interview, which was granted him on July 8, 1945. In that interview and in the letter he wrote he pressed the following points.

He complained to the President that the State Department under Grew and Dooman was abandoning the policy of "unity in China." It was abandoning its plan of supporting no party in China and giving its aid to Chiang Kai-shek. (It must be kept in mind that Chiang's government was the government of our ally China and the Communists were an armed revolutionary force.) Lattimore said this would precipitate rivalry between ourselves and Russia. He begged the President to have our policy in China reviewed by impartial advisers not connected with the formulation of policy there. He was asking the President to displace Grew and Dooman, top State Department officials, at this critical juncture and seek the advice of the Lattimore clique. Could we ask for more fantastic impudence?

As for Japan, he insisted that Japan planned a comeback as leader of an Asiatic coalition with the battle cry of "Down with the White Man." China, he said, is the key to this policy. Japan wishes to promote disunity in China. She wants revolutions in China while Japan recovers. America therefore must work for unity in China—that is, force Chiang to take in the Reds. He alleged Japan hopes America will wink at big business in Japan through fear of Russia. But big business is militarist. There are two alternatives: (1) Division of

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the country between Chiang and the Communists; (2) unification of China. This means a settlement with the Reds, who would accept a minority position "at the start." *But Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government.* Here was the whole Communist line put down in writing in Lattimore's letter to Truman. And he insisted that Washington and Moscow unite to force Chiang's agreement (pp. 3387-3389).

At this very moment the National Board of the Communist Political Association here was pressing the same plan. In June 1945 it stated:

It is the reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington . . . is pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East" (p. 3414).

Thus we see that in the desperate haste now stimulated by the approaching collapse of Japan, Lattimore was frantically pressing for the objectives of the Communist leaders here.

Not many hours after the Lattimore meeting, President Truman left for the Potsdam Conference. On July 3, James F. Byrnes had been sworn in as Secretary of State to succeed Stettinius, and three days later he left for Potsdam. He had little time to gather up the many tangled strings of our foreign policy. Time was running swiftly. Germany had surrendered. The appointed time

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CHAPTER

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THEIR efforts on the Chinese front went into high gear as soon as Secretary Byrnes reached home on August 7. They had to work fast. Byrnes, stepping hurriedly into this complex mess, deeply occupied with other areas of the war problems, like most outsiders knew little of the subversive streams running in the State Department. He had not yet spent a day in the Department and knew nothing of the cabal in the Far Eastern Division. Grew was Acting Secretary and Dooman head of the Far Eastern Division, with John Carter Vincent heading the China Section under Dooman—Vincent, the man who tried to get Lattimore into the Department and who was a member of the IPR and was for the liquidation of the Emperor and a savage peace. The position of Grew and Dooman became impossible. What force operated at this point is not known, but there can be little doubt that the conspirators got to the mind of President Truman—for from that day to this he has been the most ferocious defender of all these events. In any case, shortly after Truman returned home Dean Acheson resigned as Assistant Secretary, saying he wished to return to his law practice. Two days later Grew resigned as Under Secretary and Dooman as head of the Far Eastern Division. Immediately Acheson returned, now as Under Secretary, replacing Grew. John Carter Vincent (only recently suspended as a security risk) was made head of the Far Eastern Division to re-

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with much more of the same. William Mandel, of the IPR, who refused to deny under oath that he was a Communist, declared that Russia "proposed to apply to Asia those policies which in the words of Henry Wallace have resulted in ethnic democracy in the USSR" (italics added). Another IPR writer, T. A. Bissot, made his contribution and Agnes Smedley, the Communist agent and an IPR member, compared the Kuomintang in China to the Nazis in Germany.

There is no space here to quote all the numerous contributions all through 1944 and 1945 promoting the line set by Lattimore. Edgar Snow (*Nation*, Feb. 17, 1945) praised Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia* and quoted the nice things Lattimore said about the Communists. *The Nation* (May 28, 1945) urged that we lend Russia six billion dollars to rebuild. In the midst of all this the arrests in the Amerasia case were being blasted as an enterprise of Dooman, Grew and the Scripps-Howard newspapers. I have taken merely a few quotes from the leftist magazines to illustrate the extent, the vigor and, at times, the furious hurry of the drive to install the Reds in the Chinese government.

CHAPTER

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AS we view Lattimore in the framework of the IPR, the case against him becomes overwhelming. Consider these facts: Three of the executive secretaries of the American Council of the IPR

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I have traced in the testimony on which the above report is based the connections of these IPR staff members, writers and associates and their activities within our government. Twelve of them were employed in the State Department—eleven in responsible positions and some of them in high administrative posts. Thirty-four of them were in government positions during the war—mostly in responsible policy-making posts. One was head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, which shaped American policy in the Far East. Another was head of the Information Service of the State Department. Another was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (and a Communist agent). Another—Hiss—who was in one of the very highest positions in the State Department, is now in jail. Still another headed the Latin Division of the State Department and after being accused of being a Communist committed suicide. Owen Lattimore was head of the Pacific Division of the OWI and served as a consultant of the State Department. It was this group of men and women who wrote most of the books, and reviewed them, which the American public read during those critical years.

As for Lattimore himself, there is no doubt that he and Carter were the dominating figures in this galaxy of meddlers. Whether any individual member of the IPR was a Communist Party member is not essential to this inquiry. The main thesis is that Carter and Lattimore and their associates in the IPR carried on relentlessly, before, during and after the war years, a drive to promote the strategic plans of Russia in Asia—the liquidation of Chiang Kai-shek, the installation of the

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Communists in power in China, the bringing of Russia into the war in the East, the enfeeblement of Japan by reducing her to the state of an agrarian economy, the promotion of revolution there by uprooting her whole cultural and social system, and the delivery of Korea into the hands of the Reds. Would not any reasonable person, without any other evidence, observing these operations, conclude that these people were working in the interest of the Soviet and the Chinese Communists? Would it not be a reasonable assumption that they were either Communists or supporters of the Communist regimes in Asia? All the evidence which has been patiently reviewed in these pages leaves no room for doubt on these points. However, this record is not wanting in direct testimony on the Communist relationships of Owen Lattimore.

One witness, former Soviet General Alexander Barmine, who had renounced communism and fled from Russia, testified that in 1933 the Soviet was scheming to get possession of Sinkiang, then a part of China. Barmine was then in the Soviet Military Intelligence and he was ordered to open an office in China which would operate as an automobile importing and exporting agency. This was actually a cover for an enterprise for shipping arms and ammunition into Sinkiang. Barmine asked about the personnel available for this. General Berzin, his superior, mentioned several men he might detail. Two of them were Americans—Joseph Barnes, former IPR secretary, and Owen Lattimore. He referred to them as "our men" (pp. 199-201). Later he decided they could not be spared. Barmine, when he

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testified, had become an American citizen after serving in our armed forces and as chief of the Russian unit in the State Department's Voice of America. He testified further that General Krivitsky, his chief in Russia, had told him and other high intelligence officers in Moscow that the IPR was a Soviet "cover shop" (p. 208). Taken against the background of Lattimore's behavior in this country, this testimony becomes highly important and credible.

Another witness, Louis Budenz, former Communist, testified under oath: "He [Lattimore] was specifically mentioned as a member of the Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of his name." Budenz swore that Lattimore's "position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one" (pp. 521-522). Jack Stachel, one of the most important American Communists, in constant touch with Moscow, had informed Budenz that Lattimore was a Communist. Budenz was given orders to treat Lattimore in the *Daily Worker* as one under Communist discipline, and he explained that Communists under discipline are ordered not to have any evidence of membership about them, except in special cases where the Politburo ordered otherwise (p. 534). Budenz testified that Earl Browder, then Communist chief, said Lattimore was performing a great service by bringing Communist writers into *Pacific Affairs* (p. 530).

Budenz testified that as the war neared its end, the Party line was to work for a hard peace in Japan, aimed chiefly at the *Zaibatsu* (industrialists). In the midst of this drive, Lattimore gave an interview to the United

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Press attacking the *Zaibatsu*. This was reprinted in the *Daily Worker* and was considered so important that extra copies were run off and given widest circulation among labor unions, youth groups, etc. (p. 536). This was at the very time when Lattimore took the bold step of seeking a personal interview with the President to press this same point.

Dr. William M. McGovern, professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, was a specialist for years in China and Japan. He testified that he knew Lattimore and met him a number of times in Peking. He "saw a good deal of him" and discussed Chinese affairs with him ten or fifteen times. Lattimore, he said, "showed his warm admiration for the Chinese Communists—[said] they were the future of China and represented the real people." Then Lattimore said they were not Communists. Dr. McGovern, who is an expert on this subject, testified that he had read extensively Lattimore's writings and that he was convinced Lattimore was what he called "a popular-front man," either using or being used by the Communists, and that he definitely followed the Stalinist line (p. 1011).

Professor Kenneth Colegrove, also of Northwestern University and a specialist in Far Eastern affairs, testified that he had been a member of the *Amerasia* board when it started, but left because it seemed to be promoting the Communist line despite some objective articles. Later he learned that Lattimore during the war was head of the Pacific Division of the Office of War Information (OWI), after which Lattimore offered Colegrove charge of the Japanese Desk. Colegrove re-

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fused. The question of China came up, and when Dr. Colegrove spoke of the Chinese Communists, Lattimore angrily asserted that the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were not Communists but agrarian reformers, real democrats, and had no connection with Russia (pp. 912-913). Yet, under oath before the Tydings Committee, Lattimore declared he had never said that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers (Tydings Hearings, p. 445).

Still another expert in Asiatic and Communist affairs testified against Lattimore. Dr. Karl Wittfogel, now a professor at Columbia University, became a Communist in Europe but renounced the Party in 1932. He talked with Lattimore in China in 1944 and discussed Korea with him. Lattimore told him: "For Korea the best solution would be . . . for the Soviet Union to take over the country. He urged also the liquidation of the Mikado in Japan." In 1947, Wittfogel wrote Lattimore, making reference to this suggestion of his that Korea be taken over by Russia. Lattimore replied: "I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that Korea might be advantageously taken over by Soviet Russia. . . . As for the removal of the Mikado I have never argued that America might remove him; my position has always been that America should not be committed to the support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a Japanese demand for his removal." To this, Wittfogel replied: "It is your word against mine. As to the Mikado you are on record in *Solution in Asia*" (where Lattimore clearly supported the proposal). Wittfogel testified: "He denied what he had said before

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two witnesses and what he said in his book. I felt this was a brazen attitude and a complete lack of responsibility. I decided never to touch that man again." Wittfogel saw him shortly after this at Princeton. Lattimore said to him: "You are probably pleased that you caught me with that one about the Mikado." Wittfogel replied: "I was ashamed rather than delighted" (pp. 328-341).

Lattimore was one of the first outside journalists to be admitted to Yenan, the Chinese Red capital. He went there with Philip Jaffe and T. A. Bisson, both IPR members and both identified as Communists. They were joined by Agnes Smedley, a Communist agent who, when she died, left her estate to Chu Teh, the Red Army commander, and was given a state funeral by the Communist rulers of China. At the end of that visit Jaffe wrote in the *New Masses*: "Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge meeting addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore and myself" (p. 657). Later Agnes Smedley wrote Jaffe:

"I want to tell you you left behind remarkable friends. I did not recognize the effect of the meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in. . . . The meeting and your speech in particular had a colossal effect on all people" (p. 658).

Despite this, Lattimore swore before the Tydings Committee that he did not associate with Communists, and went so far as to say he did not know that such notorious Reds as Frederick V. Field and Philip Jaffe were Communists. Yet in his book *Ordeal by Slander* (p. 114) he writes of Field: "He strikes me as an indi-

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vidualist who has gone over so far to the left there is nobody else there except the Communists." The truth is that Lattimore had a peculiar affinity for Communists and found a powerful attraction in their society. He was associated with scores of Communists in the IPR and other organizations. Indeed, these Soviet intimacies went quite far.

In June 1941, Soviet Russia was still Germany's partner in the assault on Eastern Europe—that criminal alliance under which Stalin and Hitler invaded Poland and the Baltic States and thus launched World War II. The name of Stalin was loathed in America—not merely hated as Hitler's was, but despised as the tool of Hitler. This vicious alliance was terminated not by Stalin but by Hitler, when he invaded Russia in late June 1941. Before this break between the two arch criminals of Europe, Lattimore had just been named by President Roosevelt as a special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and was about to depart on that mission to China, where he would be in a powerful position to suggest and urge upon Chiang Russia's pet schemes. The fact that Lattimore would be going to China as an American adviser to Chiang was information of the first importance to Russia. Even before there was any public announcement of the appointment, Lattimore lost no time in delivering that information to Stalin. On June 18, 1941, shortly before Hitler turned on Russia, Lattimore and Dr. Carter went into a secret meeting in Washington with the Russian Ambassador Oumansky. When confronted with this fact at the Senate hearing, he replied—under oath—that this was after the dissolution of the

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Hitler-Stalin Pact—a falsehood which the Committee records promptly disproved (pp. 3269-3287). As the editor of *Pacific Affairs* he had printed the effusions of innumerable Communist writers, in connection with which he had exhibited his subservience to Moscow. His personal friendships and relationships among Communists were extensive.

In 1949, he bought a half interest in a home in Bethel, Vermont. His partner in the purchase was Vilhelmur Stefansson, a member of numerous notorious Communist-front organizations. The property nestled in a rustic neighborhood which was in fact a Communist colony. His neighbors were such well-known Red agents as John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Marlon Bachrach and others. When he sold his half interest it was to Ordway Southard, who ran for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket while his wife ran for the State Senate on the same ticket. Lattimore denied that he knew Southard. Nevertheless he sold his half interest without any down payment—generous terms for a stranger. He actually told the McCarran Committee that he did not sell it, that he had empowered Stefansson to sell it for him, implying that he did not know who bought it. However, when confronted with the deed signed by him personally, he had to admit his signature (pp. 3580-3585).

Lattimore became head of the Pacific Division of OWI during the war. Joseph Barnes was made head of the New York Division. Lattimore wrote Barnes, telling him to get rid of all Chinese in the bureau save Dr. Kung C. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong. The secret loyalty

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files showed that these two were considered Communists by the Loyalty Board. Chew Hong was tagged as a member of the Communist Party and hence ineligible for government service. Chi was put down as at least a fellow traveler. Lattimore insisted that Chew Hong's Communist rating be changed. He also instructed Barnes to recruit a new force from the *New China Daily News*. The Loyalty files showed that the *New China Daily News* "is a publication for and by the Chinese Communists and is described by some as the Chinese equivalent of the *Daily Worker*." The *New China Daily News* wrote editorials urging Chinese in America to send money to Mao Tse-tung, the Red leader. The president and former editor of the paper have been indicted for running a Communist racket, "embracing murder, extortion, torture and in general, commerce in human misery . . . a racket which is designed to further the aid of the Chinese Communist government" (N. Y. Times, April 29, 1953).

CHAPTER

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HERE it is necessary to describe the final act of betrayal, because it illustrates the extent to which the State Department was dominated in its decisions by its Communist and pro-Communist personnel and by the IPR. By October 1949, the pro-Communist cabal had decided that the time was ripe to abandon China, Formosa and Korea to the Reds. The

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decision doubtless had already been made, but to give it the appearance of an objective judgment a conference to discuss policy was called within the State Department for October 6, 7, and 8, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek, unarmed and abandoned by us, had been forced to retreat to the southern portions of China, but he still held four large provinces with forty percent of China's population. A week before, Congress had passed a bill allotting \$1,300,000,000 aid to Chiang. This, however, did not deter the State Department from pushing its own plans to destroy him.

The sponsor of this October meeting was the State Department. But it was in fact an IPR enterprise. It was presided over by Ambassador-at-large Philip C. Jessup, who was a long-time member of the IPR and chairman of the executive committee meeting which received with regret Fred V. Field's resignation as executive secretary of the American Council and hoped he would return to the Council after leading a notorious and public Communist demonstration. There were 25 other persons at the conference. Owen Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger, IPR leaders, took the most active part in the discussions. William L. Holland, secretary of the IPR at the time, admitted that 17 of the 25 present at the conference had been active one way or another in the IPR (p. 1144). Governor Harold Stassen, then president of the University of Pennsylvania, was asked to attend because he had been making some very pointed inquiries in the State Department about the general state of affairs in China. Governor Stassen, Dr. Colegrove and Dr. McGovern all testified that Latti-

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published any articles written by Communists in the IPR magazine *Pacific Affairs* which he edited.

5. He lied when he testified that a meeting he attended with the Russian Ambassador Oumansky was held after Hitler and Stalin had broken their alliance, when as a matter of fact it was held while they were partners.

6. He lied when he testified that he had not handled any mail for Luchlin Currie, who was an IPR man and is accused of Red connections and who was in the White House as one of President Roosevelt's confidential secretaries.

7. He lied when he denied that a 1937 trip to Yenan, the Communist headquarters in China, had been by prearrangement with the Communist Party.

Of course certain aspects of this subject will drag through the courts—as, for instance, whether Lattimore lied in several answers he made before the Senate Committee, for which he has been indicted for perjury. That is a mere subsidiary issue. What we have presented is a record of conspiracy to influence the State Department to abandon China and Korea to the Reds. That charge is supported by a mass of testimony and official exhibits. Whether Lattimore is convicted or acquitted on the charge of perjury has no definitive bearing on the central issue. The proof of what he, along with his IPR comrades, did is overwhelming and conclusive, and the final evidence lies in the grim fact that after defeating Japan our government surrendered China into the hands of the Soviets. Whether Lattimore has lied about four or five instances in the vast array of testimony submitted is, while serious for him, unimportant in the story set out here. A Senate Committee of five

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and a grand jury of 24 have unanimously branded him a liar. But the case against Lattimore presented here is not based on just his testimony or on the question of whether he lied or not. It is based on an array of testimony and exhibits from scores of witnesses so clear and definitive that there can be no question in any fair mind that Lattimore and his confederates in the IPR and the State Department were responsible for our defeat in China and the victory of Russia.

